Germanic Piracy in Roman Britain by Elverhøi, Yngve Andreas
GERMANIC PIRACY IN ROMAN BRITAIN 
Yngve Andreas Elverhøi 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented to The Department of Literature, Area Studies and 
European Languages, University of Oslo. 
ILOS, HF, UiO 
 
Fall 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
 
 
 
“Anyone can hold the helm when the sea is calm.”  
- Publilius Syrus 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I sincerely thank my supervisor, Professor Michael Benskin, for donating to me so much 
of his time and knowledge. His encouragement and attention to detail has helped me raise 
my academic standards. I also owe thanks to my dear father Henning, whose 
proofreading and comments have provided me with valuable perspective throughout the 
writing process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 4 
Background 4 
Aim 4 
Disposition of arguments 5 
Definitions and clarifications of terms 6 
CHAPTER I, GERMANIC SOCIETY 9 
Social and military development in Germanic society 9 
The power of the North Sea Germans in the first- and second century 13 
Naval capacity of North Sea Germans 24 
Summary of Chapter I 35 
CHAPTER II, THE SAXON SHORE 37 
Roman villas and coin hoards in Britain 37 
Germanic piracy in the third century 40 
Possible targets of piracy in Britain 42 
Saxon Shore: Interpreted as ‘a shore attacked by Saxons’ 46 
Tactical Aspect of the Saxon Shore Forts 51 
Strategic Aspect of the Saxon Shore Forts 54 
Saxon Shore: interpreted as ‘a shore settled by Saxons’ 62 
Summary of Chapter II 65 
CHAPTER III, CONCLUSION 67 
ILLUSTRATIONS 71 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 77 
 
 
 
 
 4
GERMANIC PIRACY IN ROMAN BRITAIN 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
This thesis focuses on Germanic piracy in Roman Britain, concentrating on the period of 
Roman occupation of Britain between AD 43 and the early fifth century. Many scholars 
have observed that the vast amount of work done on Roman Britain is disproportional to 
the relative lack of evidence from the period. Scholarly interpretation of Germanic 
seafaring differs considerably, and there has been much disagreement on the size and 
scale of Germanic piracy in Roman Britain. Firstly, the amount of concrete evidence is 
limited by the few and often inconclusive textual references to Romano-German 
relations. Apart from Tacitus’ Agricola and Germania, historical texts relate only 
incidentally to Roman-Britain and Germania, and even less has been written of seafaring 
in the North Sea. In addition, the textual evidence is confined largely to a Roman 
perspective, due to the lack of a Germanic written language at the time.1 Even within the 
historical texts we find that Roman historians such as Tacitus and Ammianus Marcellinus 
pay significantly more attention to continental inland tribes such as the Marcomanni and 
Cherusci than active mariners such as the Canninnefates, Usipi or Chauci. Secondly, 
archaeology has revealed few completely unambiguous results, and there are occasions 
when historical texts and archaeological evidence conflict. Indeed, thorough 
archaeological excavations have yet to be made at several of the Saxon Shore forts, 
rendering our understanding of a central element of Roman Britain’s history incomplete. 
Moreover, there is arguably a tendency among some scholars to overemphasize certain 
facets of the evidence that is available, for example by relying too much on either text-
based or archaeological evidence alone. This is particularly clear in cases where the fields 
provide contradictory information.  
Aim 
The intention behind this study is to examine the size and scale of Germanic attacks and 
how well the chronology of piratical raids in Roman Britain can be established. Some 
scholars indicate that there is little, if any, doubt that Germanic piracy was extensive, but 
                                                 
1 Some Greek and Byzantine sources also refer to Germanic tribes. 
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others hold a more reserved stance, arguing that the evidence can not support claims of 
any large scale barbarian attacks from across the English Channel or the North Sea. 
Others argue that the chain of coastal installations known as the ‘Saxon Shore2 forts’ 
were not a defence against pirates, but that the name merely indicates the settlement of 
Saxons in East Britain. It has been argued on the grounds of excavated pottery, weaponry 
and burial sites that Germanic people of North-Germany and Denmark migrated to 
Britain earlier than implied by Gildas, which is some time shortly after the end of the 
Roman rule in the early fifth century.3 There is no doubt that both piracy and eventual 
settlement took place, but the chronology and scale of the events remain highly 
debatable. This thesis does not, however, intend to discuss Germanic settlement in 
Britain, nor the development of Romano-British economy, outside of their relation to 
possible piracy. 
Disposition of arguments 
The disposition of this thesis follows a set of fundamental questions. Firstly, at which 
point can we be certain that Germans were socially, militarily and technologically 
capable of conducting raids on Britain? Furthermore, what evidence is there that 
Germans recognised and acted upon the capacity for piracy? Secondly, when did portable 
wealth accumulate in Romano-British settlements? Thirdly, could the possible actions of 
Germans in any way be thwarted by Roman countermeasures? If so, what is the evidence 
of such measures?  
Chapter 1 pertains to what is known of the Germanic tribes, specifically how 
changes in their culture allowed them to develop more efficient tactics of war on both 
land and sea. These social and technological developments, which seem to have gained 
momentum in the first two centuries A.D., are important in relation to Germanic capacity 
to attack and settle in Britain. Although information on the Germanic tribes that had 
access to the North Sea, either directly or via major rivers such as the Rhine, is relatively 
sparse, some knowledge can be drawn from various archaeological finds and historical 
accounts. It is only by establishing how well the Germans could operate in maritime 
environments that we can ascertain whether they could have been a real threat to the 
                                                 
2 The name derives from the Roman document Notitia Dignitatum. 
3 Gildas, Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae, II:23  
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shores of Roman Britain. The proficiency of Germanic seafarers, however, is just one 
term in the equation that may safely enable scholars to conclude that Germanic piracy 
was indeed a significant danger to Roman Britain. The economic and military 
development Roman Britain clearly also affected the chances of piracy and even the 
settlement of Germanic people there.  
 Chapter 2 encompasses a variety of subtopics regarding the developments in 
Roman Britain. The chapter includes discussion of the evidence for early Germanic 
piracy in Britain, and handles the proof of Germanic settlement on the ‘Saxon Shore’. It 
is important to note, however, that the two alternatives are only dichotomous as far as the 
disposition of this text, there is no reason to believe that Germanic people could not both 
raid and settle. An examination of the Saxon Shore fortifications, the role of the Classis 
Britannica, the economic development in Roman Britain, and various key events in 
Romano-British history – such as the Antonine Fires and the Barbarian Conspiracy – will 
be at the center of this thesis. To keep the thesis to manageable proportions I will, 
however, refrain from reiterating and elaborating on detailed circumstances of historical 
events unless it is particularly relevant. 
Definitions and clarifications of terms 
* Tribal names: Throughout the paper I employ the umbrella term ‘Germanic’ for 
the peoples of Northern Germany and Denmark,4 which historically included tribes such 
as, but were not limited to, the Frisians, Chauci, Angles and Saxons. This is due to the 
overall difficulty of accurately discerning what tribes were actually involved in particular 
events. It is unlikely that the Roman historians from which we have learned these tribal 
names were at all times capable of, or even necessarily interested in, applying the correct 
tribal name when referring to any given historical situation. Malcolm Todd remarks that 
“It is highly likely that the name ‘Saxon’ was applied by terrified provincials to any 
group of warriors who appeared from the northern seas. There will have been little 
inducement to make enquiries about their precise tribal affiliation.”5 Moreover, the fluid 
and transitional nature of Germanic tribal structure caused tribes to merge or split at 
various times, either through alliances or hostilities. In certain situations it is also 
                                                 
4 See Figure 1, p71 (Map of North Sea Germans) and Figure 2, p72 (Map of Germania) 
5 Todd 1992: 217 
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practical to discern between Germanic tribes as a whole and those tribes that had access 
to the North Sea, either through direct access to the shore or via rivers. These tribes, 
which would include Frisians, Batavi, Chamavi, Chauci, Angles and Saxons, will be 
referred to as ‘North Sea Germans’. However, where a tribe is referred to specifically by 
historical accounts, and it is beyond reasonable doubt that the account is accurate, that 
name will be used to avoid confusion.  
 * Piracy: A fundamental essence of many of the subsequent questions that arise 
in this thesis is whether the conditions of piracy could have been met during the Roman 
rule of Britain. These conditions should be kept in mind when contemplating the facts 
and arguments of the thesis. It is not to say, however, that if any or all of these conditions 
are present, that there was necessarily piracy, but merely the opportunity for piracy. The 
encyclopedia The Companion to British History defines the conditions of piracy as 
follows:  
The temptation to piracy is always present in waters which are 1) unpatrolled and 
2) used by a rich commerce. If these two conditions are alone present piracy will 
be sporadic and for personal consumption (like shop-lifting) The opportunity for 
a pirate industry to establish itself arises when, in addition, the adjacent ports (3) 
are inadequately policed and their populations can (4) build and (5) man suitable 
ships and (6) organise  an efficient market for the plunder.6 
The definition emphasizes an important point, namely the difference between piracy for 
personal consumption, and piracy with the objective of supplying larger populations in 
more organized markets. Even so, to make proper use of the definition, it is necessary to 
realise the nuances of the conditions. The term adjacent ports refers to ports close enough 
to the base of the potential pirates to strike. In this thesis it is most interesting to look at 
the opportunity for a pirate industry to establish, rather than just sporadic attacks. In that 
respect points 3 to 6 are all necessary conditions, the potential pirates must have a 
market, the ability to build and man suitable ships as well as have access to inadequately 
policed ports within striking distance. Points 1 and 2, however, are sufficient conditions, 
the waters may be patrolled to some degree and still not deter the temptation to piracy 
completely. The level of wealth of the traffic need not necessarily be ‘rich’, but sufficient 
                                                 
6 Arnold-Baker (1996: 1008) 
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enough to create a worthwhile profit for the potential pirates. Of course, the richer the 
commerce, the more tempted potential pirates will be. It is worth noting that piracy is not 
dependent on large warbands or large fleets, but may also be conducted by relatively 
small groups using speed and surprise to maximum advantage. Thus Germanic piracy 
could be in form of frequent attacks by a few ships as well as larger fleets, depending on 
their ability to assemble raiding parties and the quality of the Roman defences. 
 * Saxon Shore forts: The use of the word ‘forts’ to describe the coastal 
installations known from the Notitia Dignitatum presupposes they were military 
structures, which has not been conclusively proven. Only for the sake of simplicity will 
they be referred to as ‘forts’ throughout this text.  
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CHAPTER I, GERMANIC SOCIETY 
There is little doubt that Germanic tribes on the North Sea coast were a considerable 
problem for the Romans during the last decades of Roman control in Britain, but in order 
to examine the possibility and evidence for raiding at earlier stages of Roman Britain it is 
necessary to study the workings of Germanic society. Their capacity to organise raiding 
parties, their ability to circumvent or defeat Roman defenses, and their maritime expertise 
are all issues that require attention.  
Social and military development in Germanic society 
E.A. Thompson traces a significant development in Germanic society by examining and 
comparing the differences between the accounts of the Germans by Julius Caesar 
(Memoirs of the Gallic War, published in 51 B.C.) and Tacitus (Germania, published ca. 
A.D. 98).7 Caesar describes a society which was fragmented into family units, with no 
permanent centralised peacetime command. Only when the circumstances required it, 
such as war or another type of crisis, did Germans form assemblies to make decisions that 
transcended family units or clans. Wartime chiefs and the warbands which they 
controlled were largely ad hoc and would be dissolved upon the end of a conflict or raid. 
In addition, there would normally be a number of chiefs who represented the individual 
clans that made up the temporarily assembled warband, and the decision-making power 
was thus divided. Then, the Germanic tribes would likely be too fragmented to have 
formed large armies outside of major wars that united the people of a tribe through a clear 
common threat. Although Germanic raids into Gaul were relatively common8 it seems 
hard to believe that the temporarily assembled raiding parties could have been persuaded 
to pass over targets more proximal to their homeland, such as Gallic settlements across 
the Rhine, or within the realms of Germania itself, in favour of longer endeavours to 
Britain. This social structure, however, would undergo major changes during the period 
from Caesar’s publication to the publication of Tacitus’ Germania. An important change 
among the developments emphasized by Thompson is that Germanic society went from 
being a community that largely shared the spoils of the land equally, to a society in which 
the “leading men of the pagus each took a larger or a more fertile allotment than a rank-
                                                 
7 Thompson 1968 
8 See King 1990. Note also that Roman labels of ethnicity, such as ’Germanoi’ or ’Keltoi’, are not very 
reliable.  
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and-file warrior”.9 The privatisation of wealth, Thompson argues, came about due to the 
increased contact with Roman culture following Caesar’s occupation of Gaul. The 
introduction of more luxury articles provided by Roman traders allowed private trade to 
gain ground over trade that catered for a community as a whole – such as articles needed 
to produce and conserve food.10 As individual wealth accumulated, so did individual 
power. In Tacitus’ Germania, it appears that Germanic leaders would now also retain 
their power during peacetime. Unlike Caesar, Tacitus remarks on the presence of a 
peacetime retinue kept by leaders, writing that: “This is their principal state, this their 
chief force, to be at all times surrounded with a huge band of chosen young men, for 
ornament and glory in peace, for security and defence in war”.11 The mere exposure to 
Roman contact and trade may have been one of the major reasons that Germanic society 
developed more effective command structures and hence became more able to conduct 
concerted raids into enemy territory.  
This re-structuring of Germanic society necessitated an increasingly aggressive 
policy of raiding in order for the leaders to keep their retinues well-armed, supplied and 
content.12 Indeed, a wealthy warlord would now “attract young noblemen from 
neighbouring peoples” if their own tribe or warlord remained peaceful (and thus left the 
warriors idle) for extended periods of time.13 These groups of more permanently 
assembled warriors would also make longer expeditions and raids easier to conduct 
should there have been attractive plunder outside of their adjacent territories. It is clear 
that the increased power enjoyed by the leaders would enable them to strike at targets that 
could have been dismissed at earlier times for being too distant, dangerous or impractical. 
It must be remembered, however, that most of the information drawn upon by Thompson 
is based on Tacitus’ (who himself is merely a secondary source) observations of the more 
prominent inland tribes of Germania.  
With the changes in social structure there followed also a development of military 
character among the Germanic peoples. As was the case with the centralisation of power, 
however, it is hard to discern at what times the individual tribes were at what stage of the 
                                                 
9 Thompson 1968: 18 
10 Thompson 1968: 18-20 
11 Tacitus Germania, Part I  
12 Thompson 1968: 52 
13 Thompson 1968: 58 
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progression toward becoming more militarily structured. Whatever changes in Germanic 
military tactics and social structure that had taken place by Tacitus’ time, during the first 
century, need not yet have taken place among the Germanic tribes settled on the North 
Sea coast at that time. Indeed, it is possible to argue that there was a considerable delay in 
this social reformation, from the time when the earliest tribes adopted a strong, 
centralised command, such as the Marcomanni, to the time when the North Sea Germans 
can be said to have done the same. The Marcomanni, who resided in Central Europe 
adjacent to the Roman provinces of Vindelicia, Noricum and Pannonia,14 were by A.D. 
17 ruled by the first known Germanic autocrat, Maroboduus. Obviously, the Marcomanni 
were well aware of Roman culture, and vice versa, and from Velleius’ Roman History it 
can be seen that the Romans respected how organised the Marcomanni had become. 
Velleius writes that Maroboduus’ body of guards had through “constant drill (…) been 
brought almost to the Roman standard of discipline”.15 Thompson remarks that “The 
peoples who had reached this stage of development, however, attracted the attention of 
Rome and were clearly exceptional”.16  
On the battlefield, the Germanic tribes were far less advanced than the Romans in 
terms of tactics and weaponry, although the battle of Teutoburger Wald in A.D. 9 proved 
that Germans could in favourable conditions overcome large Roman forces. Still, as the 
social changes reformed the old traditions of independently fighting family units and 
temporarily formed warbands, the Germans would – at different times – progress toward 
a more organised battlefield structure such as was the case with the Marcomanni. 
Thompson points out that this early alteration of the way the Germans organised armies is 
known to have affected three peoples (the Marcomanni, the Cherusci, and the Chatti), but 
there is no evidence that other Germanic tribes had taken this step by the first century.17 
Nevertheless, beneficial as such an organisational development would be for any 
Germanic tribe, it would not have been a requisite condition for piracy. After all, the 
North Sea Germans, particularly the Chauci  and later the Saxons who did not share a 
border with the Roman Empire, would not have needed to organise large armies in the 
                                                 
14 See Figure 1, p71 (Map of North Sea Germans) and Figure 2, p72 (Map of Germania) 
15 Velleius Paterculus II: 109 
16 Thompson 1968: 65 
17 Thompson 1968: 67 (Although Germanic ’armies’ were not nearly as organised or well-equipped as their 
Roman counterparts.) 
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same manner as the tribes of interior Germania. Piracy and raiding are rather different 
from large scale battles. Even if the North Sea Germans did not adopt advanced 
battlefield tactics as early as the tribes of interior Germania, they would certainly benefit 
from employing smaller units using hit-and-run tactics. Indeed, the Germans would have 
trouble beating the Romans in open battle despite their adoption of some Roman tactics. 
In Annales, Tacitus comments that their inferior weaponry and extensive use of long 
spears were ineffective in dense forests where the Romans could wield their gladius with 
more ease.18 In the open, Roman tactics and discipline would regularly overpower the 
Germans. Only in very favourable conditions could the Germans hope to defeat a Roman 
army of equal numbers. It is obvious that while the Germans could occasionally 
challenge a Roman force by a combination of favourable numbers, terrain or morale, they 
would normally suffer defeat if the Romans could choose the battleground. Thus, the use 
of raiding parties, hit-and-run tactics, such as pirates would likely employ, would often 
greatly enhance the Germans’ chance of success against Roman forces. It is likely that 
pirate bands would attempt to avoid confronting Roman defences whenever possible 
because raiding is motivated by profit and not conquest.  
It is quite clear that there were fundamental social developments in Germanic 
society during the first centuries A.D. While it is difficult to trace these changes within 
each tribe, and some tribes do not seem to have adopted a strong centralised command 
even by the end of Roman control in Britain, the increased contact with the Roman 
Empire following its subjugation of Gaul appears to have spurred a significant change 
toward privatisation of wealth. That, in turn, allowed coercive and financial power to be 
concentrated among fewer leaders, who became increasingly influential. So, even though 
not all tribes would be ruled by a single king (or a select group of leaders), the local 
leaders surely gained more authority over their men during the first- and second 
centuries. Nonetheless, the exposure to Rome did not inevitably lead all Germanic tribes 
to adopt Roman command structure and battlefield tactic, such as keeping battlefield 
reserves. For example, the history of the Saxons, whose earliest known acts of piracy 
were recorded in the 280s A.D., show “little sign of any strong centralized power” even 
                                                 
18 Tacitus, Annales, book II, Ch 14 
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in the third- and fourth century.19 Because the Marcomanni of the first century were 
under pressure from Roman armies, they had to organise larger armies to protect their 
lands. The Chauci and the Saxons, on the other hand, were under no such direct pressure, 
for they did not even share a common border with Rome. Moreover, their protection from 
direct assault from Rome created an environment where smaller units of warriors could 
be more efficient than organising one large force – if their ambitions were to raid and not 
to conquer land. Even so, it is still relatively clear that most Germanic tribes would in any 
case progress at least partially toward having fewer, but more powerful, leaders during 
the first- and second century – as well as having leaders who retained their retinues 
during peacetime. These developments were strikingly similar to the changes that 
occurred within Norse society during the tenth century, in which “Stronger and more 
centralized kingdoms could finance the building of pure warships”.20 With the 
‘conditions of piracy’ in mind, these changes would grant the North Sea Germans greater 
flexibility and opportunity to act upon a ‘temptation to piracy’ should the conditions have 
permitted it to be so. These conditions will be discussed further throughout the paper. 
Despite the evidence that Germanic society developed a greater capacity for raiding, we 
must remain cautious of concluding that raiding indeed took place because of it. 
The power of the North Sea Germans in the first- and second century 
A problem with regard to Germanic piracy in early Roman Britain is simply that the 
tribes that would have been potential pirates are rarely mentioned in any known historical 
text. Some scholars regard the mere lack of information as a sign that Germanic piracy 
was not a problem at the time: otherwise they maintain tribes like the Chauci, Frisi, 
Canninefates or Chamavi would have figured more prominently in the historical 
accounts. Yet from Tacitus’ Agricola there is a chronological gap of more than 250 years 
to the (incomplete) Roman History written by Ammianus Marcellinus, and even though 
the complete text treated the period of Roman history between 96 A.D and 378 A.D., 
only fragments remain, describing events from 353 A.D. to 378 A.D. Other texts fill parts 
of that gap, but none in such detail as displayed by Ammianus and Tacitus.21 What is 
                                                 
19 Todd 1992: 216  
20 Christensen 2002: 135 
21 e.g., Aurelius Victor, Eutropius, Vegetius and Zosimus incidentally refer to Britain and Germania. 
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known then of the early North Sea Germans? In Annales, Tacitus describes a Frisian 
rebellion dated to 28 A.D. A newly appointed Roman centurion named Olennius began 
strictly enforcing a tribute of animal hides that had previously been treated rather 
leniently by Rome. The Frisians, who were hard pressed to produce the quality of hides 
required by Olennius, found themselves buried in debt to the degree that lands and slaves 
had to be ceded to Rome. The ensuing revolt stunned Rome, and the surprising Frisian 
victory brought the Frisians fame across Germania.22 What we can learn from these 
passages is that Rome appears at the outset to have been in relative control over both the 
Frisians and the Canninefates - who were being employed as auxiliaries against the 
Frisian revolt. Despite the military loss, Tacitus remarks that the Roman forces were 
“(…) strong enough, had they charged altogether, but coming up, as they did, at intervals, 
they did not give fresh courage to the repulsed troops and were themselves carried away 
in the panic of the fugitives”.23 It is possible that Tacitus ascribes the loss to poor 
leadership in order to calm worried readers about the prospects of continued Roman 
dominance at the frontier, but the impoverished Frisians nevertheless defeated technically 
superior opponents. Tacitus implies that the Senate did not care “whether dishonour fell 
on the extreme frontiers of the empire”, and writes that domestic problems in Rome 
occupied and worried them more. In that context, Tacitus’ text, while describing a painful 
loss, implicitly signals that a change in leadership at the frontier could be a remedy. 
Tacitus was also, at least by the time of the Annales, distinctly critical of what he, and 
many of his contemporary Roman intellectuals, perceived to be the decay of the 
leadership and morality of the Roman Empire.24 It is possible to speculate that his 
narrative exaggerates the feats of the barbarians in order to bring to attention the 
problems in Rome. Despite their victory, the Frisians seem weak and would some 
nineteen years later be displaced from their lands by Rome.25 It would be surprising if 
they could have presented any significant threat outside of their borders, especially across 
the North Sea, during this time. The same applies to the Canninefates, who were located 
even closer to Roman-dominated Gaul, and were used as Roman auxiliaries against the 
                                                 
22 Tacitus, Annales, book IV: Ch 72-74 
23 Tacitus, Annales, book IV: Ch 73 
24 Wallace-Hadrill 1971: 2  
25 Tacitus, Annales, book XI: Ch 19 
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Frisian revolt. The Canninefates, however, would reappear in a more aggressive role in 
A.D. 69. When the Canninefates joined auxiliary officer Gaius Julius Civilis’ revolt 
against Rome in that year, they began the process by electing a leader named Brinno. 
Thompson argues that this move implies that they had “no chief at all in time of peace or 
that the peacetime chief was not identical with their leader in war”.26 That indicates, 
according to Thompson, that the custom of electing leaders specifically for a conflict, as 
Caesar described it, remained even during this time. Again it is obvious that structural 
changes within Germania were not uniformly adopted across tribes, since the 
circumstances of the Canninefates were similar to that of the Marcomanni, who became 
an autocratically ruled tribe at least fifty years prior. Tacitus describes the Canninefates 
as “courageous”, but “inferior in numbers”.27 In Dark Age Naval Power, John Haywood 
claims the Canninefates had a central role in the 69/70 A.D. revolt. Throughout his book, 
Haywood argues that early Germans were far better seafarers than scholars have 
previously assumed. His case for the capacity of the first- and second century Germans 
relies heavily on Tacitus’ description of Civilis’ revolt, and at times he may be stretching 
his case too far. Haywood writes: “It seems likely that the Canninefates were the leading 
naval power among the barbarian allies”.28 Haywood forms his argument on the basis of 
the Canninefates’ early victories in the revolt, when they successfully “assailed by sea the 
winter quarters of two cohorts”.29 Nevertheless, Haywood may be overemphasising these 
victories, as the two cohorts would number about 300-600 men each, a force which 
would hardly withstand the elements of surprise and isolation while likely being 
outnumbered by the enemy. Tacitus writes: “The soldiers had not anticipated the assault 
of the enemy; even had they done so, they had not strength to repulse it.”30 Then again, if 
the combined forces of the Canninefates and Frisians could summon troops and ships 
enough to outnumber these cohorts, they might have been able to do so at other times 
during the first century. In this instance, it seems unlikely that Tacitus was exaggerating 
the barbarians’ valour in order to contrast Roman society, because he explicitly reports 
the very unflattering actions of the barbarians, who “(…) fell upon the sutlers and Roman 
                                                 
26 Thompson 1968: 33 
27 Tacitus, Historiae, book IV: 15 
28 Haywood 1991: 10 
29 Tacitus, Historiae, book IV: 14 
30 Tacitus Historiae, book IV: 15 
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traders, who were wandering about in every direction, as they would in a time of 
peace.”31  Ultimately, everything appears to have favoured the barbarians during the 
attack, and it would be unduly speculative to estimate their strength from this victory 
alone. Haywood also remarks that, with the aid of some captured Roman ships, the 
“Canninefates attacked a Roman fleet off the North Sea coast and won a resounding 
victory; most of the Roman ships were sunk or captured”.32 As Haywood himself points 
out, the Canninefates were likely reinforced by a fleet of twenty-four warships of the 
Classis Germanica captured by the Batavi. Whether the Canninefates would have been 
able to defeat the Roman fleet without Roman ships is uncertain. In addition, Haywood 
attributes the burning of the Roman fort at Valkenburg (situated at the mouth of the Old 
Rhine) to the Chauci raids of 47 A.D., while also referring to (though only in his notes) 
van Doorselaer who suggests it was destroyed in a joint effort from the 
Frisians/Canninefates during the 69/70 A.D. revolt.33 This way, Haywood enhances the 
impression of both the Chauci and the Canninefates (assisted by the Frisians) as major 
naval powers during the first century. It may yet have been so, but the fort could hardly 
have been destroyed34 by all the tribes (Chauci, or Canninefates and Frisians) when their 
attacks were some twenty-three years apart. Even though he sometimes seems to 
overstate the ability of the Germans, Haywood is able to shed light on situations in which 
the North Sea Germans were clearly able to challenge the Romans at sea, as well as their 
ability to use the sea- and waterways for surprise attacks. The case for an established 
pirate industry in the North Sea during this time remains hanging in the balance, 
however, because there is little to suggest that piracy was a problem during the first 
century aside from outright conflicts like the A.D. 69/70 rebellion. Indeed, even though 
the barbarian naval operations of the rebellion suggest that some Germanic tribes were 
able to raid from the sea, the situation does not describe piracy as it is normally 
understood – as raiding parties motivated chiefly by the possibility of profit. 
If North Sea Germans such as the Frisians were not likely to have presented a 
significant threat to Roman Britain during the first century, largely for a lack of 
                                                 
31 Tacitus, Historiae, book IV: 15 
32 Haywood 1991: 11 
33 Haywood 1991: 10 
34 It was actually the cohorts defending the fort that set it on fire, upon seeing that they could not hold it. 
(Tacitus, Historiae, book IV) 
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resources, and were experiencing pressure on their own lands; and the Canninefates were 
only partly a threat being occupied by Rome and thus more controlled by Rome; the 
enigmatic Chauci could have been a bigger problem for Rome, as they were a very 
powerful tribe. Tacitus describes them and their lands in Germania, “A region so vast, 
the Chaucians do not only possess but fill”.35 He adds that the Chauci, although quite 
ready and able for war, were a: 
“(…) people of all the Germans the most noble, such as would rather maintain 
their grandeur by justice than violence. They live in repose, retired from broils 
abroad, void of avidity to possess more, free from a spirit of domineering over 
others. They provoke no wars, they ravage no countries, they pursue no 
plunder”.36 
This was Tacitus’ impression of the Chauci recorded in ca. 98. A.D., but there are records 
of Chauci raids into Roman controlled Belgica as early as 41. A.D., after which the 
Roman victor Gabinius took the name “Chaucius” upon defeating the barbarians.37 The 
Roman convention was for a victorious commander to adopt an honorific following the 
defeat of a serious adversary.38 Nonetheless, this tradition may also have been used to 
promote the standing of a lesser victor. Though it is perhaps not entirely in conflict with 
his impressions of the Chauci as noble and just, yet ready to fight if necessary, it is 
interesting that Tacitus writes in Historiae  that “some auxiliaries from the Chauci” 
joined Civilis’ in the 69/70 A.D. revolt.39 Tacitus was thus either unaware of the events of 
Chauci aggression at the time he described them as peaceful, or the Chauci could have 
been less willing to exert coercive power during the time between the attacks in 41.A.D. 
and 69/70 A.D., and the time when Tacitus wrote Germania (ca 98.A.D.). Alternatively, 
Tacitus intended his representation of the Chauci to juxtapose the aggressions of the 
Empire. We can not assume that the Chauci were completely placid as a people simply 
because the social structure hardly allowed an absolute ruler to emerge. Still, Tacitus’ 
portrayal of the Chauci in 98.A.D. signals quite strongly that they were not at that time a 
threat to Rome. Later in the second century, the Chauci reappear as a pirate threat to 
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Roman Britain, but they would vanish from known textual record after ca 170-175 A.D. 
Haywood spends much effort on arguing that the Chauci presented problems for Rome 
during the first centuries A.D., a case that clearly carries some validity.40 Nonetheless, his 
arguments are again stretched, claiming upon the evidence of a few incidents that 
“Chaucian piracy was probably to remain endemic in the North Sea and Channel until, in 
the next century, it was replaced by Frankish and Saxon piracy”.41 While some of the 
Chauci were undoubtedly involved in piracy during the first two centuries A.D., it is hard 
to prove that they were a prevalent threat to Roman interests in Britain and Gaul during 
that time. Cases of aggression in which the Chauci are named are few, although their 
potential as a tribe would almost certainly have been unparalleled by their Germanic 
neighbours due to their numbers and accessibility to the North Sea.42  
Archaeological excavation has uncovered a pattern of destruction, dubbed the 
‘Antonine Fires’, of a number of small Trinovantian towns in the period between 170 
A.D. and 200 A.D. The phenomenon has commonly been linked to extensive piracy and 
this interpretation is a centerpiece in Haywood’s argument that Chaucian piracy was 
firmly established in the North Sea during the second century.43 Note also that Haywood 
reflects on the “lack of any other historical context to account for the widespread 
destruction”, which is clearly an ‘absence of evidence’ fallacy.44 Malcolm Todd, 
however, suggests that these destructions were “perhaps indicating an outbreak of civil 
commotion”.45 The circumstances in Roman Britain during the last three decades of the 
second century provide some merit for both explanations. It appears that troubles were 
accumulating in Britain throughout the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and his son 
Commodus. There is a sharp increase in the number of coin-hoards buried during the 
reign of Marcus Aurelius, and a number of hoards in East-Anglia, Suffolk and Essex have 
a terminus post quem of Faustina II (died 175 A.D.) or Lucilla (died 182 A.D.), which 
indicates the presence of a threat spatiotemporally close to the earliest outbreak of the 
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Antonine Fires.46 Todd reflects on the increased Roman reliance upon the defences at 
Hadrian’s Wall, following the failure of the Antonine Wall, and the fact that “the 
attention of the High Command was being focused on the Danube provinces in 
particular”.47 Roman forces were drawn from Britain to the troubled areas of Germania, 
thus leaving Britain more exposed to rebellion or enemy attacks. Indeed, Dio Cassius 
writes that “the greatest struggle was the one with the Britons”, though that conflict 
between ca. A.D. 180-184 was with northern barbarians coming from beyond Hadrian’s 
Wall.48 The internal struggles in Britain could have tempted both domestic and foreign 
aggression in the absence of adequate policing by Rome. In addition, the accruing wealth 
of many Romano-British settlements could have tempted piracy during the second 
century, as “Almost all the cities which have been adequately studied have produced 
evidence of a burgeoning of civic and commercial life”.49 In short, there would have been 
ample reason and opportunity for Germanic pirates to raid Britain during this time, but is 
there proof they actually did?  
Of a total of thirteen Trinovantian sites to show signs of destruction, six50 suffered 
extensive fire damage. Whereas sites that suffered minor fires, such as Harlow or Tilty, 
did not have earthwork defences prior to the attacks, nor had defences added after the 
attacks; all six sites that sustained major damage were either walled (or in the process of 
having walls constructed) or have produced late Roman military equipment.51 P.J. Drury 
deals with at least five sites within the Trinovantian civitas that have been connected to 
the Antonine Fires - all of which were apparently provided with some form of earthwork 
defence during ca 160-175 A.D.52 Drury further points to finds of a “probably military, 
certainly contemporary, copper alloy mount” at one site and the uncovering of various 
other objects connected to military activity at other sites.53 Even though it seems fairly 
certain that at least some of the towns were at some point during the late second century 
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visited by Roman troops, the evidence is not entirely conclusive. One of the most 
important artifacts found, the copper alloy mount, could possibly be civilian.54 During 
times when no garrison was present, a local militia may have been responsible for 
manning the earthwork defences. In addition, there is no way to establish causal 
connection between the arrival of troops at a rebellion or an act of piracy from the 
currently available evidence. The chronological detail remains uncertain: some 
settlements may have suffered damage prior to construction on their walls, while others 
may have suffered damage after their defences were built. The evidence appears 
equivocal, as neither the construction of walls nor the presence of soldiers would be 
unique to either piracy or civil commotion.  
There was a drastic increase in the construction of walled protection of towns all 
across Britain after the middle of the second century.55 The construction of these walls 
took place over an extended period between A.D. 138-185 at the least, however, and 
scholarly attempts to establish a common reason for the upsurge of defensive 
construction have been largely unsuccessful. The re-location of Roman troops to 
mainland Europe may have necessitated the construction of more permanent defensive 
structures, but the transferal of troops was conducted in stages and is hard to link directly 
to the increase in defensive structures. If there was merely one cause it is hard to believe 
piracy was the motive, because a number of the cities that had walled defences 
constructed were either too far from a waterway or (presumably) too poor to attract 
pirates.56 At present, however, there seems to be reason to believe that there was more 
than just one cause for all the defensive improvements across second-century Britain, and 
piracy may have been the cause of Trinovantian towns being given earthwork ramparts. 
In fact, defensive renovations and improvements were added at some of the sites 
associated with the Antonine Fires, in a second phase near the turn of the second century, 
suggesting a more serious threat level here than elsewhere in Britain. It appears the threat 
was transient, however, because the earthwork defences of Chelmsford was abandoned in 
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the early third century, and work on the defences in Wickford was discontinued late in 
the second century.57 
The severity of the attacks is evident, although observed only at Wickford and 
Colchester in Essex, through the discovery of unburied human skeletal remains, some of 
which have been gnawed upon by wild animals – which suggests no one dared, or lived, 
to bury the bodies following an attack in which parts of the towns were destroyed by 
fire.58 Indeed, the pattern of destruction of cities during the final decades of the second 
century is unique to the Trinovantian civitas. It is tempting to argue that the addition of 
extra defences particular to towns in the coastal regions of Eastern England is reason to 
believe piracy was looming, but we can still not entirely exclude the chance of a 
Trinovantian rebellion. Drury points out that the towns connected to the Antonine Fire 
were not just destroyed, but “subsequently had their walls levelled, rather than 
maintained and improved, which seems to be peculiar to this region”.59  Both Drury and 
others reflect on Clodius Albinus’ efforts to seize power in Rome as a possible reason for 
the addition of town defences in Britain, particularly along the coastline that could be 
exposed to piracy.60 Still, Cloduis’ bid for power came in 196 A.D., which means it is 
basically too late to fit with the timeline for the Antonine Fires, unless defence 
construction, fires and possibly the arrival of reinforcements were all events of the last 
four years of the second century, which seems unlikely. Even if the dating of the fires is 
somewhat imprecise, it is hard to link the fires to Clodius’ actions alone.  
Some of the defensive improvements of Romano-British towns during the second 
century could be connected to whatever caused the rather dramatic surge in coin hoards 
during later years of Antonius Pius’ reign and the beginning of Marcus Aurelius’ reign.61 
This pattern of coin hoards suits the chronology of the fires better than the events 
following Clodius’ campaign in Gaul, but without knowledge of the events it can only be 
the basis of speculation. The total number of coin hoards dated between 156-161A.D. far 
exceeds the number of hoards dated to the decades prior to and after this period of time. 
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Nonetheless, Rodwell points out that there is no obvious peak in coin hoards in Essex, or 
indeed elsewhere in Eastern England, that directly correlates with the dating of the 
Antonine Fires.62 How does the absence of coin hoards reflect on the explanatory power 
of piracy or civil unrest as reasons for the Antonine Fires? One would expect the desire to 
stow away valuables in personal hoards to be present whether pirates or rebels were the 
threat.63 It is possible that the absence of coin hoards could simply be because all the 
valuables were taken. Clearly, there are a variety of ways in which to link the absence of 
coin hoards to either side of the argument, depending on the severity, speed and 
forewarning of the pirate raids or rebellion. It is perhaps tempting to argue that piracy 
would yield a larger number of hoards, because plundering during a rebellion could last 
longer and be more thorough since local people themselves would be part of it – and 
those people would likely have more precise knowledge of where to find loot and 
possibly also have better opportunity to extort from locals the whereabouts of their 
wealth. Nevertheless, a determined band of pirates could just as well have produced 
similar results. During a rebellion in which the aggressors were within, there would 
perhaps be less time to hide valuables. Still, it is unknown whether the damages caused 
were due to rebels roaming the land or if troubles mainly started from within each 
settlement. There are innumerable reasons why people would hoard valuables and fear of 
unrest is just one of them. Further, wealthy members of Trinovantian towns would be 
sure to recognise the situation once one or two settlements had rebelled, which would 
obviously have led to an increase in coin hoarding similar to that which would be 
expected during an extended period of piracy. The overall sample of coin hoards for the 
second century is indeed quite small, and while the anticipated pattern of coin hoards that 
would normally be found in the wake of a large scale disturbance such as the Antonine 
Fires is not present, it may exist though yet undiscovered, or the anticipations could 
themselves be wrong.  
In theory, piracy or rebellion could produce largely overlapping results, which 
renders it difficult to conclusively eliminate one explanation in favour of another based 
on the evidence currently available. Considering the general lack of Roman troops, 
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however, would it be sensible to construct so many walled defences in provinces that 
would be prone to rebellion? After all, without proper garrisoning, these walls would 
easily be taken by the rebels and could be used against Roman attempts to pacify the 
region. Foreign raiders, on the other hand, would not harbour ambitions of using forts, 
and the local population could make use of walls to hide behind regardless of the 
presence of any Roman garrison. In this explanation, the emergence of town walls all 
over Britain is disregarded, as many of the walled towns were not subject to a pirate 
threat. Towns in northern Britain, however, could have been under threat from territories 
under little or no Roman control, such as raids coming from beyond Hadrian’s Wall. 
There were walled towns probably outside of danger from raiders, which means it is 
unlikely that the walls around Britain were all constructed as a result of direct threat from 
raiders. Still, it is not unreasonable to assume that walls would be better employed against 
raiders than rebels in times when garrisons were depleted or even non-existent, which 
seems to have been the case when Clodius’ drew troops from Britain to the Continent 
during the late second century. Traditionally, the Antonine Fires have been interpreted in 
light of the similar pattern of destruction of roadside villages in Belgica, though most 
scholars would agree that the similarity does not entail that the cause is the same. 
Chaucian piracy is seen as the most likely reason for the damages in Belgica.  
The Chauci vanish from historical record after ca 170 A.D., which Haywood argues is 
because they merged with the Saxons. Although alternative theories to the 
‘disappearance’ of the Chauci have been put forth, the archaeological continuity of the 
people in the region suggests there is little chance the Chauci migrated elsewhere.64 It 
seems like North Sea Germans such as the Frisians, Canninefates and Chauci were during 
the first century only occasionally able to strike against Roman interests and were at other 
times either incapable or unwilling to do so. Still, it is clear that combined efforts, such as 
Civilis’ revolt, would enable Germanic tribes to cause Rome severe problems. 
Unfortunately, the evidence for these early conditions is only available through Roman 
textual records, and can rarely be thoroughly supplemented by archaeological discoveries 
of this period in time. The records of situations in which the normally quite fragmented 
Germanic tribes joined their efforts are relatively few, thus we are left with the 
                                                 
64 Haywood 1991: 14 
 24
impression that the Germans would mostly operate as relatively small hit-and-run groups. 
The patterns of destruction such as the Antonine Fires or the Belgian Roadside Villages 
may indicate that piracy became increasingly troublesome during the second century, 
although for this period of time we must rely almost exclusively on archaeological 
excavations, contrary to the heavy reliance on text for events of the first century. Even 
though it is hard to attribute the increase in walled defences in Britain during the second 
century to a single cause, the addition of a second phase of walls around cities in Eastern 
England does suggest that piracy, or a local rebellion of non-urban origin, was becoming 
a significant threat. That leaves an array of questions to be answered: how well were 
Germanic pirates able to defeat or bypass Roman defences; construct and sail ships 
adequate for the safe transport of men across to Britain; and was there a sufficient 
accumulation of wealth in Britain to tempt the Germans to large scale piracy? In addition, 
the first fort associated with the Litus Saxonicum was very likely constructed early in the 
third century, and its arguably military purpose (cf. p44-45) lends more credibility to the 
theories that piracy could have threatened Roman Britain as early as the 200s.  
Naval capacity of North Sea Germans  
In Britain and the Western Seaways, E.G. Bowen shows the formerly held axiom among 
many early archaeologists that: “the seas divided and the land united.”65 This was a view 
entrenched by the knowledge that the Roman Empire had been connected by a vast 
network of roads. Though the idea has been abandoned by scholars, Bowen still finds it 
necessary to warn against the sweeping generalisations that have been made in the wake 
of its defeat. He especially criticises the cartographic displays of sea routes extending 
hundreds or thousands of miles across the oceans. Clearly, anyone with maritime capacity 
could not necessarily unrestrictedly navigate the open sea, because naval travel would 
also be limited by elements such as the seaworthiness of the ship, the audacity of the 
sailors, and restriction of access by others either through patrols, denial of land on which 
to re-stock supplies (should it be necessary) or various other defensive measures. The 
major difference of sea-travel opposed to land-travel in the time of the early Germans is 
that maritime movement allowed for more flexibility, speed, range and surprise – all 
conditions that are ideal for people already adept at hit-and-run tactics, as illustrated in 
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many Germanic attacks on the Continent.66 The sea allowed pirates to pick their landing 
zones, strike quickly and swiftly vanish afterwards. What tactics could the potential 
Germanic pirates on the coast of south and east Britain have employed during their raids? 
N.A.M Rodger claims that:  
“What they seldom if ever did was to fight one another actually at sea. To 
intercept an enemy in the open sea calls for ships spread far away in a 
sophisticated scouting system which does not seem to have been attempted until 
the sixteenth century”.67   
Rodger goes on to claim:  
“It would in any case have been futile when no battle could be fought on the open 
sea. No missile weapons existed in northern waters capable of sinking a ship, nor 
was it possible to fit rams to the ships of the Northmen. All fighting was hand-to-
hand and naval battles could only take place where ships could come alongside 
one another”.68  
These apparent restrictions pose the question: If the capacity to fight on the open sea was 
so limited, could there be piracy in open waters? Given that finding appropriate targets on 
the sea would be very difficult, it is clear that piracy was dependent on coastal traffic and 
settlements adjacent to navigable waterways, which leads to two conclusions: 1) The 
pirates would be able to scout and spot their targets more easily and 2) the defenders 
could be protected more easily by shore installations or rapid reaction forces (which 
several scholars argue was the purpose of the Saxon Shore forts). Germanic knowledge of 
when and where high-value and low bulk articles were transported would be limited, 
however, and thus it is much more likely that piracy was concentrated on raiding 
settlements. Information on wealth concentration in settlements could come from 
Germanic auxiliaries or traders returning home from Britain (cf. p43).69 
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How would the Romans deal with raiders arriving on the coasts of Roman 
Britain? Firstly, J.C. Mann comments that “We need not assume that the naval scouting 
vessels operating off the British coasts, described by Vegetius (IV.37) – hulls, sails and 
rigging camouflaged sea-green, as also the men’s uniforms – were a new invention of the 
fourth century. Only such vigilant operations will (sic) have kept down North Sea and 
Channel piracy before the third century crisis”.70 Mann seemingly contradicts Rodger, 
who claims that sophisticated scouting systems were not attempted until much later. It is 
possible that the Romans conducted their scouting on a more rudimentary level, closer to 
shore, and still made use of camouflage. Secondly, it is clear that the Romans did patrol 
the waters around Britain, especially to the south and east, during the first and second 
century, and the Classis Britannica71 was arguably their principal defence against 
potential piracy during the first two centuries of Roman Britain.72 Although the history of 
the Classis Britannica is unclear, most scholars accept that the fleet originated from the 
invasion of Britain ca 43 A.D.73 The fleet was highly likely occupied with a transport and 
supply role throughout its existence, but Tacitus also writes that it was used to attack 
various British settlements.74 According to Tacitus, the Roman fleet remained 
unchallenged around Britain for some time after 43 A.D., although he may refer only to 
the lack of Briton opposition.75 There is uncertainty attached to the fleet’s exact history 
though, for example, during Agricola’s governorship a fleet was required for Suetonius 
Paullinus to cross to the island of ‘Mona’ (Angelsey) to attack the Ordovices in the early 
60s A.D. Tacitus says that there was “no fleet” for Paullinus to cross with because “his 
plans were not matured”,76 which could be used to question the efficiency of the Classis. 
In the event, Paullinus improvised and crossed without the assistance of a major fleet. 
The lack of a fleet must be attributed to the Classis Britannica being occupied elsewhere 
with no time to arrive. Whether the presence of the Classis Britannica did deter pirate 
raiders to any degree is still debatable. It is possible to speculate that Tacitus could have 
created the impression that the Classis Britannica and the Romans were unchallenged so 
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as not to reflect badly upon his father-in-law, Agricola, who governed Roman Britain. 
Mann, however, argues that; “It is probably fair to think that piracy did not exist in the 
Channel or the North Sea during the Principate precisely because the Classis Britannica 
did exist”.77 One fact supporting Mann is that units from the Classis Britannica were 
deployed to construct various buildings and fortifications – including parts of Hadrian’s 
Wall, which was completed during the 120s A.D. – indicating that the Roman fleet did 
not always have to operate at full capacity to suppress any seaborne threat. It is also 
possible, however, that resources were drawn from the fleet to invest in a long term 
defence of the Northern provinces from tribes beyond the Wall, temporarily weakening 
the fleet’s ability to handle a Germanic threat. Later construction of the Saxon Shore 
forts, if one entertains the notion that their purpose was defensive and military, strongly 
suggests that the fleet alone was not enough to counter the pirate threat. In fact, the sheer 
enormity of Mann’s claim, that the Classis’ presence meant piracy did not exist 
throughout the Principate, a period lasting for more than two hundred years, seems 
unreasonable. Mann’s conclusion hardly holds up in light of the many separate accounts 
of piracy during both the first and second century, although the fleet could periodically 
have suppressed piracy. For example, the first known records of naval raids on Roman 
territory tell of raids by the Chauci on the coast of Belgica.78 Tacitus may have had the 
temporary impression that the Romans were unchallenged around Britain, but it does 
seem as if piracy was, or at least went on to be, a thorn in their side – which is arguably a 
reason why the Saxon Shore forts were constructed. Mann relates the situation in the 
North Sea to that of the Roman success in fighting Mediterranean pirates during the 
reigns of Pompey and Augustus,79 but the two operational theatres are not directly 
comparable. For instance, the Romans would have much less control over areas from 
which North Sea pirates could come, and thus have a much harder time striking back at 
the source of piracy than they would in the Mediterranean. That is not to say that the 
Classis Britannica was not a deterrent, however, or that it could not have largely 
suppressed piracy during certain periods.  
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  Even though it is hard to conclude that there was significant piracy during the first 
two centuries of Roman Britain, the accumulation of circumstantial evidence such as the 
accounts of the Chauci, the Antonine Fires, the destruction of roadside villages in 
Belgica, all point to pirate activity, though piracy could have occurred in intervals rather 
than as a continuous stream of attacks. As Rome faced growing problems during the third 
and fourth century, the scale of piracy in the North Sea and Channel seems to have grown 
accordingly. One element that could inhibit the potential severity of piracy was the 
capacity of Germanic vessels. How early could the North Sea Germans construct and sail 
vessels that would not just get them across to Britain, but do so with the capacity of 
bringing back sufficient booty for the raiding to be profitable? The most desirable 
valuables, such as coins or jewellery, would occupy little space in a ship and thus booty 
would probably not present a logistical problem. Julius Caesar refers to the Veneti80, who 
in 55-54 B.C. were temporarily able to escape his legions by sailing out of reach of the 
Roman forces. According to Caesar, the Veneti’s flat bottom, leather sail, oak vessels, 
were well suited for both the open sea and shallow low-tide waters. He also noted that the 
Venetian ships were superior to Roman vessels save for speed and the fact that the 
Roman vessels could be driven by oars.81 Lionel Casson remarks that the Venetian ships 
appear to have had the same “distinguishing characteristics (as) the craft found at 
Zwammerdam and elsewhere in Northern Europe”.82 Still, the Zwammerdam barges and 
dugouts, dated to 150-225 A.D., were river vessels used in calm waters.83 If Germanic 
ships were as seaworthy as the ships Caesar describes, however, pirates could clearly 
have crossed the open North Sea.  
Haywood says that it is likely the Chauci possessed naval vessels that could carry 
a crew of 30 to 40 men as early as the first- and second century.84 Alternative theories on 
the naval capabilities of Germanic tribes, the Chauci included, suggest that it was not 
until the mid-fourth century that they could make ships that carried as many men and 
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were as seaworthy as the Nydam oak ship.85 Haywood adds that the Nydam ship does not 
even represent the upper size limit of such ships either, as finds in east Jutland have 
revealed a ship probably in the same size range as the Sutton Hoo ship – which carried 
some 40 oarsmen. Haywood claims the ships used by Germanic seafarers during the 
period from the birth of Christ until around 300 A.D. resembled the above-mentioned 
ships more than they resembled the earlier dug-out canoes of the centuries before the 
birth of Christ. Haywood uses the records of the Usipi to support the argument of such 
early barbarian naval activity across the North Sea. The Usipi served as auxiliaries under 
Agricola on the west coast of Britain when they rebelled and seized three Roman galleys. 
After sailing round the coast of northern Britain they crossed the North Sea. The Usipi’s 
actions seem to be a testament to their skills at sea, boat handling in particular, but also 
their ability to navigate the uncharted waters of northern Britain. They might have had 
the advantage of the well-crafted Roman ships, but such ships surely required a skilled 
crew to operate them. Arne Emil Christensen provides a noteworthy criticism of 
Haywood’s interpretation of a similar incident in which Frankish rebels seized a Roman 
fleet and used it to raid places in the Mediterranean.86 Haywood relates this incident to 
the under-appreciated maritime skill of the barbarians, but Christensen suggests that the 
Franks may have pressed Romans into Frankish service, rather than sailing the ships 
themselves.87 This explanation could be applied to the case of the Usipi as well. 
Christensen’s emphasis is criticising Haywood’s arguments that early Germanic ships 
were not notably inferior to their ‘successors’ the Vikings. What is more relevant to the 
question of early Germanic piracy, however, is how well the Germanic ships could have 
fared, regardless of their semblance to ships like Sutton Hoo or the Jutland ships. Even if 
the Germanic ships were not as sophisticated, they may still have been capable of 
carrying pirates across to Britain.  
It is important to distinguish between Germanic boats that were built for and 
primarily used on rivers such as the Rhine, and vessels constructed to navigate the ocean, 
of which little is known. Many river barges of the Roman period have been found in the 
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lower Rhine area.88 These boats were carvel built89, which made them very suitable for 
calm river waters, though their quite rigid structure is normally at a disadvantage in 
rougher seas. Since archaeology has produced so few clearly ocean-going Germanic 
vessels for the time before the Nydam ship, it has been hard to bridge the gap between the 
early Germanic log boats and the rather sophisticated Nydam ship. Still, it has been 
disputed whether the Nydam ship was ocean-going,90 and it was clearly not a sailing 
vessel.91  While Haywood claims it is “far more realistic to conclude that the first- and 
second-century raids of the Chauci were carried out in comparable types of plank-built 
ships than in dug-out canoes” there is no conclusive evidence to support such a 
statement.92 The question yet unanswered is to what degree were the Germanic ships 
from the birth of Christ until 300 A.D similar to the Nydam or Sutton Hoo ships. The 
level of seaworthiness and number of troops they could carry are essential to determine to 
what degree they could strike the coasts of Britain. If they were indeed as sophisticated as 
Haywood argues, there is no reason why Germanic tribes could not have struck across the 
North Sea from beyond the northern Roman borders on the continent, nor is there much 
doubt they could have carried enough men to cause problems when they arrived. It is 
possible to argue that some Germanic tribes must have possessed some knowledge of 
naval travel in order to populate the British Isles in the first place, even though they may 
not necessarily have navigated the open sea in order to do so, but possibly rather using 
the shorter crossing points between the continent and Britain. At this point, it is a case of 
different degrees of maritime capacity, however, because crossing the North Sea at one 
time or another is not decisive proof that piracy was possible. Indeed, the sea routes the 
North Sea Germans may have used in order to reach the coasts of Britain have been much 
debated as well. Some scholars, like John Cotterill, claim that the maritime capacity of 
early Germanic seafarers has been exaggerated. He argues, partly on the grounds of 
research done by Greenhill (1979) and Green (1963), that an open sea crossing of the 
North Sea would be impossible due to the poor quality of Germanic boats; the lack of 
proper navigational aids; the immense effort it would take to row across (he suggests an 
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11 day journey, included a 24 hour open sea crossing, between Jutland and East Anglia); 
and the need for rest following the arduous journey.93 The quality of Germanic boats is 
largely obscure, yet we can infer from textual records that the craft possessed by at least 
some North Sea Germans enabled them to raid Gaul via coastal sea lanes.94 Contrary to 
what Cotterill claims, there are a variety of non-instrumental navigational techniques 
German seafarers could have used. The early Germans were by all accounts not 
unfamiliar with celestial navigation, and contact with Mediterranean cultures would 
likely further refine these skills. Seán McGrail also describes numerous methods to 
navigate the open North Sea without relying upon celestial bodies. Wind direction, for 
example, can be ascertained by the weather accompanying it, and “Swell on the other 
hand gives more certain indication of direction for longer periods, although less 
pronounced in summer than winter”.95 Experience at sea would also enable sailors to 
predict what was just beyond the horizon by observing “orographic cloud, the flight of 
seabirds at dawn or dusk, seaweed and jellyfish in the water” among other natural 
phenomena.96 That Germanic raids across the North Sea would have required 
considerable resolve is beyond question, but it does not exclude the possibility of 
Germanic piracy in Britain. The raiders could have found rest in secluded spots along the 
coast, as Bidwell suggests.97 Moreover, Cotterill argues on the basis of Germanic 
migration patterns from the fifth and sixth centuries that third- and fourth century 
Germanic pirates also “interrupted their journeys with short stops in the Netherlands”.98 
A problem with this reasoning is that the local people at the stopping points would not 
likely welcome passing pirates, who would possibly strain local food supply, occupy 
land, and create unrest by their presence. It can also be erroneously presumed that pirates 
would for safety always have preferred to navigate their ships just off shore – though 
Cotterill’s reasoning rests on the Germanic boats’ incapacity of open sea travel. 
Problematically, the coastline is often a more treacherous alternative than the open sea 
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due to the risk of running into a reef or being intercepted by defenders. Further, the 
implicit trepidation of open sea travel in the North Sea tends to be overstated, perhaps 
encouraged by examples like the Roman soldiers’ refusal to sail “beyond the bounds of 
the world” before the invasion of Britain in A.D. 43.99 While the idea of open sea travel 
in the North Sea could have been viewed as particularly dangerous to some Romans, it 
does not at all follow that the North Sea Germans would have shared the Roman 
sentiment. Cotterill’s denial of the possibility of Germanic navigation of the open North 
Sea conflicts with the number of textual accounts of Germanic seafarers striking at the 
coast of Gaul, which in itself implies that some Germanic tribes could build and man 
relatively seaworthy ships; and that the early construction of the Saxon Shore fort at 
Brancaster suggests that Germanic seafarers may have reached the Wash early in the 
third century (cf. p44-45).  
In the absence of archaeological evidence for ocean-going Germanic vessels, 
scholars have had to rely upon text to reveal insight on Germanic naval capacity. 
Haywood points out that Tacitus says the Chauci raided in “levibus navigiis” which he 
translates as ‘light’ or ‘swift’ boats.100 Alternatively, it could mean ‘swift navigations’, in 
sense of the present idiom ‘lightening raids’.101 Tacitus’ reference to the Chauci comes in 
connection with Chauci raids along the coastline of Gaul during Claudius’ reign (41-54 
A.D.), which clearly shows that at least some North Sea Germans had boats capable of 
carrying sufficient men to strike beyond their borders.102 Generally, however, Tacitus 
refers to Germanic boats with the same word he uses to refer to Roman boats: ‘luntres’,103 
which is a wide term that could include “anything from rowing boats to small sailing 
ships”.104 Haywood makes a point that Tacitus uses the same word for Roman and 
German boats, which could imply that they were not entirely different, at least in the 
sense of capacity and seaworthiness. What type of Roman boat the Germanic vessels 
resembled is obviously debatable. It is noteworthy that Tacitus did not himself observe 
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these ships, but instead relied upon second-hand sources, which could lead to 
simplifications like the use of the word ‘luntres’ for Germanic as well as Roman vessels. 
The account of Civilis’ revolt has also provided scholars with some insight into Germanic 
ships. It allows us to consider the seamanship of the early Germans, though it is reported 
only incidentally in Roman accounts. Two naval engagements are particularly interesting. 
First, in the initial clash between Civilis’ rebels and the Roman army, the Batavian 
auxiliaries in the Roman fleet mutinied. Tacitus explicitly writes that the Batavians on 
board the Roman vessels were rowers, perhaps indicating that this was their only role on 
these particular ships. The Batavians managed to thwart operations on board and ran the 
ships aground on the barbarian shores. They then “killed the pilots and centurions, unless 
these were willing to join them”.105 It seems Christensen’s explanation of the Frankish 
raids in Roman ships or the Usipi’s circumnavigation of Britain in captured Roman 
vessels could fit in this case as well. Even if barbarian auxiliaries serving on Roman ships 
were only rowers, they could have acquired at least some understanding of sailing simply 
by observing the crews who were trained sailors. D.B. Saddington argues that some of 
the pilots, centurions and the prefect of the fleet were also Batavian, which would 
indicate the Batavian auxiliaries were in fact competent sailors.106 Then again, if we 
assume that some Germans were in fact capable of operating sea-going ships, it does not 
follow that all of them could do so. In the second battle, the Roman fleet had gathered to 
oppose Civilis’ at the mouth of the Meuse,107 and Civilis now had the advantage of 
having the Roman ships seized during the first skirmish. Tacitus remarks that “this 
expanse of water” was “not unlike the sea”, which adds to the impression that Germanic 
sailors were capable of navigating beyond calm river waters. The barbarian fleet 
consisted of a mixture of Roman ships, among them triremes and Liburnian galleys, and 
also captured ships which the Batavians had fitted with improvised sails. Haywood 
argues, quite soundly, that this shows that “to at least one Germanic tribe involved, a sail 
was an essential part of a seagoing vessel”.108 Why sails, ‘an essential part’, would have 
to be improvised could be due to the destruction of the original sails during the capture of 
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the vessels. Scholars have tended not to agree, however, whether Germanic ships had 
strong enough keels to permit a mast and sail before sometime after the seventh 
century.109 Nevertheless, it would have been quite possible for early Germanic seafarers 
to use a hog truss, or take down the sail in weather not suitable to their particular ship. 
For the case of Germanic adaptation of sails, Haywood makes a number of valid points, 
but again he makes some unreasonable assumptions. For example, he argues that “If a 
Nydam-type ship could carry a sail in the seventh century, it could carry a sail in the 
fourth century or even earlier for that matter”.110 We can not merely assume that 
Germanic seafarers took advantage of sails merely because they had the opportunity to do 
so, and Christensen even remarks that “ships like the Nydam ship are not sailing 
vessels”.111 Moreover, Haywood also argues that since the Germanic word segel was 
adopted from Celtic prior to the first contact with the Romans, the Germans would also 
have adopted use of the device itself.112 This is decidedly, in so far as words may be 
adopted independently of what they signify, a non sequitur. Word adoption separate from 
device adoption has occurred on numerous occasions, for example, the British adopted 
the word Stuka113 during World War II, but never used or manufactured dive bombers 
themselves. Despite some of the flawed arguments presented by Haywood, he presents a 
strong case for the use of sails among some of the North Sea Germans due to their 
exposure to Roman sailing vessels, in particular among the tribes that were involved in 
Civilis’ revolt. Nevertheless, the use of sails among Germanic seafarers is not a necessary 
condition in relation to piracy, although they could aid Germanic pirates greatly in terms 
of range and speed.  
Lastly, it is well established that the sea-lanes between Britain and the continent 
were used frequently by traders, as described by Bowen in Britain and the Western 
Seaways, which discusses for example how Breton-crafted axes were traded to Britain as 
early as the late Bronze Age.114 The connection between Brittany and Britain was severed 
with Caesar’s defeat of the Veneti in 56 B.C., but the trade routes would merely be 
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altered, not discontinued.115  There is also some sparse evidence for trade between 
Roman Britain and the Rhineland during the second and third centuries.116 The Britons 
traded heavily with the Gauls, exporting grain, cattle, hunting dogs, slaves, gold, silver 
and iron; and imported ivory chains, necklaces, amber and glassware among other 
things.117 Whether there was enough concentrated wealth to tempt Germanic piracy in 
Britain prior to the arrival of the Romans is unknown, taking into account that raiding 
Gaul would likely be a more attractive target. During the second century, however, it 
seems clear that Roman-Britain was developing well economically and would become 
increasingly interesting to Germanic tribes with the naval capacity to exploit the coastline 
of Eastern Britain.118 Their interest, of course, could be manifested in trade just as well as 
piracy. In regard to the particular waters around south and east Britain, one may argue 
that the temptation to piracy was strong due to considerable trade coming through those 
waters from the second century onwards, and providing the ‘rich commerce’ which could 
have tempted raiders. Pirates were probably more interested in raiding close to shore or 
even strike inland, hence the need for coastal defences. Rodger claims: 
“The best answer to seaborne attack was a combination of fixed defences and 
ships. It was impossible to build or garrison fortresses to cover an entire 
coastline, but it was possible to fortify places which command the entrances to, 
and crossings of, rivers in such a way as to hinder a naval force from penetrating 
inland119”  
These are thoughts possibly shared by the Romans in their construction of the Saxon 
Shore forts, which would secure shores and trade-centres. 
Summary of Chapter I 
It appears that all the conditions necessary for Germanic piracy to arise was met or in the 
process of being met during the first- and second century. The Germanic social 
developments enabled longer raids, and many of the Germanic tribes were already 
experts at raiding into foreign territory. The increasing concentration of wealth and power 
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among Germanic leaders throughout the four centuries considered by this thesis not only 
allowed more frequent and longer raids, it necessitated raiding to fund the permanently 
assembled warbands. While the capacity and willingness of some North Sea Germans to 
conduct raids appears to have varied throughout the first two centuries of Roman Britain, 
they did occasionally attack. Furthermore, as Roman trade, mining and culture began to 
spread throughout Britain there was a clear increase in the accumulation of wealth during 
the second century. Nevertheless, while first century piracy in the North Sea has been 
attested by historical records, no such texts are available for the second century. 
Archaeological evidence from late second century Belgica and Britain reveal destruction 
patterns that appear to be caused by either piracy, bagaudae banditry, or both. Brigands, 
or a combination of pirates and brigands, could account for much the widespread 
construction of walled defences in Britain during the second century. Still, it is necessary 
to consider the developments in Roman Britain more closely– such as the construction 
and purpose of the Saxon Shore forts.  
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CHAPTER II, THE SAXON SHORE 
The string of coastal forts on the south and east coast of Britain known as the ‘Saxon 
Shore forts’ could provide insight into the size and scale of any seaborne threat during the 
time both before and after they were built. Their size, structure and location could say 
something about the perceived threat before they were constructed, while evidence of 
how the Romans used them later could provide an indication of how a pirate threat 
evolved. If and only if, one can establish what the forts were actually used for, not 
necessarily designed as, will it be possible to use them as a part of an argument on the 
size and scale of piracy. Even if the forts were not originally designed for military 
purposes, it is possible that they were later adapted to meet a threat presented by seaborne 
attacks. Similarly, if they were constructed for military purposes, they might not have 
been so used during the entire period, but merely taken on other functions. In that respect, 
the chronology of occupation is as important as the dating of the original construction. It 
is also important to examine whether the necessary conditions for piracy in Britain were 
met. The economic growth of Roman villas and coastal settlements, the accumulation of 
coin hoards, and the accounts of major events such as the so-called ‘Barbarian 
Conspiracy’ of 367 A.D. are central to understanding the course of Germanic seaborne 
raiding in Britain. The third century brought the Roman Empire an array of problems 
among which it is commonly believed Germanic piracy was significant. However, some 
scholars hold the view that the threat from Germanic pirates has been exaggerated and 
that the evidence is too limited to infer the existence of a pirate threat to Britain during 
the third century. It has been speculated, for reasons considered below (cf. p55), that the 
Saxon Shore forts were not military, but functioned as trans-shipment centres. It does 
appear, however, that there is some evidence of Germanic piracy in third and fourth 
century Roman Britain, particularly during periods when Rome struggled to cope with 
internal problems as well as external threats.  
Roman villas and coin hoards in Britain 
A proper study of Germanic piracy in Roman Britain could not be limited to the Saxon 
Shore forts or Germanic ambition and capacity alone. Piracy is dependent upon the 
availability of concentrations of low volume and high value goods. It is necessary to 
examine at what times Britain would have been an interesting option for potential pirates, 
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which requires at least a rudimentary look at the development of the Romano-British 
economy. It is important to note that economic growth in Roman Britain could coincide 
with piracy, because raiders would seek portable plunder such as precious metals, 
gemstones or jewellery, which were items reserved for the social elite. The mainstay of 
the economy, however, such as farming and industrial production would rarely be of 
interest to pirates, though collateral damage to housing and production facilities could 
temporarily harm production levels. Thus, a thriving economy is not evidence of absence 
of piracy. Moreover, the lack of destruction patterns other than the Antonine Fires is not 
conclusive evidence for lack of piracy. As Pearson remarks, “it presupposes that raiding 
barbarians instinctively destroyed any site that they looted”, which would be an 
ineffective way of avoiding detection by the Roman defenders.120 
Roman life, in terms of architecture, agriculture and substantial trade, generally 
spread quite slowly into rural areas of Britain. The earliest Roman-style farms that have 
been discovered were all situated near navigable estuaries in ca. 55-80 A.D. in Kent and 
Sussex.121 Still, this period has produced few Roman farmsteads, and it appears many 
regions were not sufficiently policed to safely construct villas until the late first century 
onward.122 Todd speculates that the proprietors of the early villas were not only 
concerned with agriculture, but also had commercial interests. Whether these Roman 
farms were earning and accumulating enough valuables to warrant the interest of pirates 
is unknown, although the continued development of farms and villas as well as the 
mining of metals and minerals in Britain is sure to have provided temptation to piracy 
once valuables were accumulated in trading centres accessible to pirates. In addition, the 
protection of rural sites must have been quite difficult, even though the Classis 
Britannica would probably have patrolled the British coast during this time during the 
late first- and early second century (cf. p26-27). The distribution of coin hoards, however, 
suggests that the inhabitants of East England did not experience much concern until the 
reign of Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A.D.) and the Antonine Fires (cf. p18-23). Anne S. 
Robertson remarks that it is almost indisputable that: “The practice of saving or hoarding 
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continued without interruption throughout the whole span of the Roman occupation in 
Britain”.123 It is hence possible to attribute some significance to variations in coin hoard 
distribution, which would not have been possible if there was no continuous practice of 
hoarding. Apart from a clear pattern of hoards in East England during the reigns of 
Claudius (41-54 A.D.) and Nero (54-68 A.D.) there is no marked accumulation of hoards 
in East England. The East-Anglian hoards of a post-Claudian date are most probably to 
be connected to domestic instability following the invasion in 43 A.D., while post-
Neronian hoards are probably linked to the Iceni revolt. It is improbable that Germanic 
piracy was the reason for the hoarding in Claudian or Neronian East Anglia. The hoards 
of the following periods, during the reigns from Vespasian (69-79 A.D.) to Antonius Pius 
(138-161 A.D.) also appear to support what textual record say of the Roman military 
campaigns in Britain.124 Even though coin hoard evidence is by nature inconclusive, it is 
noteworthy that the number of hoards in East England is very low until the reign of 
Marcus Aurelius. In the 190s, the Roman Empire experienced a number of coups d'état, 
which Todd argues may have led to considerable wealth going into the res privata.125 In 
196 A.D., the usurper Clodius Albinus brought his army to the continent, severely 
depleting the British garrison.126 The uncertainty that accompanied the numerous power 
shifts could have been an opening for piracy, since the Roman defence of Britain suffered 
from disorganisation, and wealth could have accumulated in less defended private 
quarters. The raids that could have followed may be the reason why the first Saxon Shore 
forts were constructed in the early third century. Unfortunately, the lack of Imperial 
continuity also means that no coin hoards can be linked to this period with any accuracy. 
 Burnham and Wacher argue that the general pattern of expansion in the small 
towns of Roman Britain during the second century is contrasted with decline from the 
“later second century onwards”.127 This decline, however, largely struck industries like 
pottery production and salt mining, none of which are susceptible to piracy. Burnham and 
Wacher also remark that the deterioration of these industries was “largely confined to the 
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west Midlands-Cheshire plain area” and must be viewed as an exception to the general 
development of Roman Britain during the last quarter of the second century. Todd claims 
assumption of decline in the prosperity of Roman villas during the third century is not 
supported by sufficient evidence. He argues the difficulty in asserting decline from the 
lack of improvements of a villa as a major reason, since substantial changes could have 
been made to the wooden structures of a villa without altering the superstructure. In 
addition, many villas that show signs of abandonment were re-occupied and show signs 
of ambitious rebuilding, which Todd argues is due to ownership change rather than 
decline in prosperity.128 Archaeologists have been largely unable to use pottery-dating for 
events in the third century due to the unchanging Romano-British pottery tradition 
throughout that time. What is clear is that by the end of the second century, Romano-
British towns were increasingly well organised and largely prosperous. Roman efforts to 
construct new walls or improve existing defences around many towns continued during 
the third century and into the fourth.129 It does not follow, however, that walls were added 
exclusively and specifically for protection against an enemy. Constructing walls would 
also enhance a town’s importance and status, which could in itself be a motivation.  
Germanic piracy in the third century 
Stephen Johnson argues that by the third century Roman commanders in Britain no 
longer considered the presence of the Classis Britannica enough to suppress piracy 
around the south and east coasts of Britain. He claims: “During the third (century), the 
fleet (Classis Britannica) evidently ceased to function as effectively as before, for, by its 
end, Franks and Saxons were in control of the sea-lanes.”130 It is debatable if, per 
definition, it would be possible to ‘control’ sea-lanes at all (cf. p24-25), but it appears that 
the Classis could not effectively deter pirates during the third century. Haywood 
introduces a theory that sheds light on Johnson’s statement; “There seem to be three main 
causes for the third century upsurge in Germanic piracy on the northern and western 
coasts of the Roman empire: firstly, changes in the tribal structure of the west Germans; 
secondly, a political and economic crisis in the Roman empire; thirdly, the start of a 
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marine transgression”.131 The changes in tribal structure are discussed in the first chapter, 
while the political and economic problems in the Roman Empire are discussed 
throughout this chapter. Haywood argues that marine transgression gave more Franks and 
Saxons easier access to the sea and made it easier to conduct naval operations and gave 
displaced people a good reason to seek other lands to settle upon.132 These events, claims 
Haywood, provided the backdrop for the construction of the Saxon Shore forts and have 
led scholars to believe the forts were a defence against a growing pirate threat. Of eighty-
seven archaeologically attested large roadside villages (vici) in Belgica, thirty-one failed 
to survive the late third century and of the fifty-six that did survive, twenty-two had been 
fortified by ca. 300 A.D. and had reduced populations.133 Haywood adds that the rate of 
failure to survive is far higher in the coastal civitates, a pattern which he links to piracy. 
Although the sample from Belgica is taken from a much longer period than the Antonine 
Fires, it has been assumed that piracy may at least have been partly the reason for the 
destruction. Edith Wightman, however, states that there is little conclusive evidence as to 
what caused the extensive damages.134 It is worth noting that these kinds of destruction 
have traditionally also been attributed to bagaudae,135 but this type of banditry has been 
as difficult to study as piracy. Wightman remarks that the original destructions (some of 
the vici were re-built only to be destroyed again) could easily have meant that “the 
dislocated and dispossessed provided a fertile recruiting-ground for the leaders of the (…) 
bagaudae”.136 It is possible that piracy started a snowball-effect that grew into large scale 
banditry of both internal and external origin. What can be generally discerned from the 
pattern of destruction in Belgica is that the Roman Empire was losing territories to unrest, 
which would allow further exploitation of the weakened population by such forces as the 
bagaudae or barbarian raiders. Villages in south and east Britain, however, show no 
similar patterns of destruction during the third century. In fact, it seems that Roman 
Britain was experiencing a period of relative growth during this time. Todd argues that 
the reason why Britons appears to have readily accepted Carausius’ usurpation in 286 
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A.D. was that the region was “among the most secure and stable in the west”.137 Of 
course, it is a leap to conclude that that Carausius’ rather unproblematic usurpation was 
entirely due to the prosperity of Britain, or indeed that economic growth can be back-
tracked through the third century as a whole. Todd himself states that the third century is, 
in terms of historical accounts of Britain, “a Dark Age more impenetrable than the fifth 
century”,138 and scholars are thus building many of their arguments upon an absence of 
evidence. Several scholars139 have noted that there is virtually no textual evidence of 
piratical attacks on Roman Britain, whereas seaborne attacks on the coast of Gaul are 
relatively well documented. Importantly, the lack of archaeological evidence of 
destruction in Britain compared to the extensive damages across the Channel does lend 
some credibility to claims that Britain was indeed spared extensive piracy during at least 
parts of the third and fourth centuries. That, in turn, brings about what may appear as a 
dissonance of evidence, because no less than twelve coastal forts connected to the Litus 
Saxonicum140 were constructed during the third century. Brancaster and Reculver, which 
have produced evidence of military occupation (cf. p44-45 & p59), have been relatively 
safely dated to the early third century, while the remaining forts all appear to date from 
the second half of the third century (further, p49-53). When at least some of the forts 
were military, and several scholars141 claim all the forts were garrisoned, why would 
military installations have been constructed during a period of little or no threat? If the 
Saxon Shore forts were intended to combat piracy, an analysis of Germanic piracy in 
third century Britain requires an understanding of the context in which the forts 
developed.  
Possible targets of piracy in Britain 
Johnson believes there is some slight evidence for Roman military activity at two forts 
not associated with the Litus Saxonicum, among them an auxiliary fort near Brough-on-
Humber. He speculates that there may have been forts now lost in the sea that “linked the 
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fort at Brancaster more closely with the coastline opposite the Wash”.142 Johnson also 
remarks that the Wash was an ideal invasion route due to the presence of the navigable 
rivers the Nene and the Witham, and Haywood says the Romans believed Germans 
“capable of mounting a major sea-borne invasion of Britain”.143 Their statements appear 
to require moderation, however, because there are no signs that Germans were capable of 
launching an invasion of Britain during the third century. Moreover, Johnson himself 
observes on the forts that: 
“All the sites lie on comparatively low ground near a harbour, and thus they 
represent defended ports rather than military positions sited to gain the maximum 
advantage from an elevated defensive position”.144  
Therefore, the positions of the forts make little sense if fear of an invasion was the reason 
they were constructed. Pirates, however, would have little reason to attack the forts 
themselves (cf. p52-53). It is perhaps more likely that Germanic raiders used the Wash to 
access attractive targets in the Fenland – which was becoming a wealthy region of 
Britain: The “Nene valley saw major economic expansion during the Hadrianic period 
and throughout the second century”.145 The area has produced a number of stone 
buildings believed to the residence of conductores,146 which indicates there would 
probably have been considerable accumulated wealth in the area. Knowledge of wealthy 
sites accessible from the Wash could have been provided by returning German auxiliaries 
that had finished their service with Roman forces in Britain. It is well documented that 
North Sea Germans like the Usipi, Batavians, Tungrians, and Frisians served as 
auxiliaries in Britain.147 Moreover, evidence suggests that some of the kiln masters 
working at Longthorpe from the A.D. 60s were immigrants from the Rhine area.148 
Clearly, there were both civilian and military links between the Rhineland and the 
Fenland. It is unclear what fate befell the Fenland during the third century, however, but 
its agricultural economy seems to have suffered due to natural flooding. The fortified 
                                                 
142 Johnson 1976: 20 
143 Haywood 1991: 36  
144 Johnson 1976: 122 
145 Upex 2008: 202 
146 Conductores would have been employed to collect taxes, etc.  
147 Hassell 1978: 41-42 
148 Upex 2008: 89 
 44
Roman town Durobrivae149 grew to become an important military and industrial centre 
during the second and third century since it “was well positioned for communication and 
trade across the whole of Roman Britain”.150 Durobrivae’s hinterland shows clear signs 
of prosperity during the second century, which continued into the third century.151 If 
Brancaster was built to protect the inlets of the Nene and Witham rivers, Durobrivae and 
the surrounding area must have presented an array of interesting targets for potential 
raiders, so necessitating the strong military presence there.  
Although the loss of sites north of Brancaster can not be proved, the fact that Brancaster 
was one of the earliest forts to be erected presents an interesting case.152 Of the system 
that would later form the Saxon Shore command, Brancaster is the northernmost and the 
farthest away from the strategic chokepoint at Dover (where a fort was later 
constructed).153 It is reasonable to assume that the Romans, even during a relatively 
peaceful time, would construct their forts where a threat would be most difficult to 
handle. Thus, the fact that Brancaster was constructed at a site relatively far away from 
the shortest North Sea crossings suggests not only that some pirates had the capacity to 
strike across the open sea, but that they could do so early in the third century. The 
Germanic pirates could either have traveled down the coastline of Friesland and Belgica 
before sailing all the way up the coast of East England, or they could have chosen the 
relatively safer and quicker route across the open sea (cf. p41-42). The open sea route is 
between 100 and 160 nautical miles,154 but the coastal route would at least double that. If 
Cotterill is correct, and Germanic tribes could not sail across the open sea during the third 
century, there seems to be no military motive for building Brancaster – since attacks on 
the Wash would require a substantially longer and more dangerous journey than 
alternative targets along the east coast of Britain. The discovery of fragments of tiles at 
Brancaster, however, suggests the cohors I Aquitanorum was associated with the fort at 
some point early in the third century, possibly having contributed to the fort’s 
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construction and garrisoning.155 Although the fort remains largely unexcavated, it also 
appears to have had a praetorium,156 which strengthens the argument that the fort was 
operational in a military sense during the early third century.157 By the time the Notitia 
was compiled, Brancaster was garrisoned by a unit of equites Dalmatae. Thus the fort 
was at least some time during the late fourth century garrisoned by a highly mobile unit 
well-suited to combat piracy. While it is possible to speculate that Pictish piracy could 
have presented a threat to the Wash, Brancaster’s location indicates its purpose was to 
intercept pirates coming from the east, not the north.158 Without evidence of any auxiliary 
forts near the north of the Wash, Pictish piracy does not seem to be the reason to protect 
the Wash during the early third century. Thus, the relatively early construction of 
Brancaster suggests that Germanic pirates chose the open sea in favour of traveling along 
the patrolled coasts of Belgica and Britain. Consequently, even as early as the first half of 
the third century it appears that a pirate threat around the Wash could have been more 
severe than most other places on the shores of East Britain. The apparently coincident 
decline of the Classis Britannica is an important element of this interpretation. If the 
Classis was still operating efficiently in the Channel, it would make sense to protect the 
most distant frontier first, since the Classis could hardly be expected to intercept pirates 
at Brancaster if otherwise stationed near the chokepoint at Reculver or Boulogne. Henry 
Cleere comments that “A funerary inscription from Arles suggests that the fleet itself was 
still in being in the 240s”.159 Brancaster’s construction must nevertheless be seen in light 
of the impending restructuring of the fleet and its apparent lack of efficiency during the 
early third century.160 Later in the third century, the Romans obviously focused on 
reinforcing the defences around the Thames estuary and the Channel. The presence of a 
fort at Brancaster, regardless of the efficiency of the Classis, suggests that the rivers 
emptying out in the Wash were targets for Germanic pirates.  
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 By the mid-third century Germanic pirates such as the Franks and Saxons were 
clearly wreaking havoc upon the Channel coast, although seemingly concentrating on the 
continental side, arguably evidenced by the construction of forts in Belgica, and the 
invasions of Gaul in ca. 260 A.D. and again in ca. 276 A.D. Johnson writes: “The great 
invasion of 276 in Gaul brought repercussions also on the Channel coast, for there the 
threat of invasion was equally severe: the Saxons’ mobility made them an enemy to be 
feared all along the exposed coastlines”.161 Attacks into Gaul from beyond the Rhine (and 
Danube) contributed to the creation of the ‘Gallic Empire’, which broke away from 
central rule in 260 A.D. Germanic attacks, as well as bagaudae banditry prevailed even 
after restoration of the central Empire in 274 A.D.162 The West Roman empire was 
clearly in trouble and Britain was probably no exception. The barbarian raids into Gaul 
and the Romans’ trouble to contain them points to there being definite reason to increase 
defences on the coast of Britain. It is in this context that most of the Saxon Shore forts 
were constructed, most probably between the mid-third century and ca. 285 A.D.163 There 
have been numerous efforts to attribute the construction of the coastal installations to a 
single cause, however, the internal power struggles, many shifts in power and subsequent 
changes in interest from central Roman authorities render it unlikely that the forts were 
part of a single, coherent central strategy. It seems more likely that forts were added in 
several phases, according to the threat perceived by the governors of Britain.  
Saxon Shore: Interpreted as ‘a shore attacked by Saxons’ 
There are conflicting views on the intended and practical use of the Saxon Shore forts 
and even the reason for the name Litus Saxonicum. The term ‘Saxon Shore’, known only 
from the Roman document Notitia Dignitatum, has generally been interpreted to mean 
one of two things, either “Shore under attack from Saxons” or “Shore on which the 
Saxons have settled”. A third theory put forth by J.G.F. Hind is that the ‘Germanic Sea’ 
(North Sea) was known as the ‘Saxon Sea’ during the third century,164 but the theory is 
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not supported by any textual references to a ‘Saxon Sea’.165 The Notitia Dignitatum 
survives only as a fifteenth-century copy of a document that must have had its origins at 
the end of the fourth century. It is hard to ascertain how up to date the various parts of it 
are, and in some respects what forts named in it can be linked to known remains of forts 
today. Unfortunately, the large gap between its original compilation and the time it was 
copied leaves room for misinterpretations and copyists’ errors.166   
That the Comes Litoris Saxonici per Britanniam is listed among ‘frontier 
commanders’ in the Notitia Dignitatum is probably the strongest reason for assuming that 
the name is of military origin. Johnson concludes that “Where there is a frontier, a limes, 
the Romans would have understood there to be a distinct fortified line”.167 The Notitia 
Dignitatum describes both sides of the Channel as Litus Saxonicum.168 The singular Litus 
as opposed to the plural Litora (shores) may seem strange as applying to two distinct 
shores (the coast of Britain and the coast of Gaul). Johnson explains this as a Roman 
military distinction, thinking of the shores as one area of command.169 Johnson’s theory 
is that: 
“The Saxon Shore forts were not merely concerned with the protection of Britain: 
they formed a Roman frontier, guarding the north-eastern reaches of the empire, 
including parts of northern Gaul. The defence of these areas and of Britain went 
hand in hand”.170  
It is possible that the Saxon Shore forts were not originally a frontier command structure, 
but were operated in another fashion prior to forming the Litus Saxonicum. Given that the 
forts were constructed in phases during an extended period, it is difficult to ascertain 
exactly when the Romans deemed it necessary to form the Litus Saxonicum as it is known 
in the Notitia. Alternatively, the Litus Saxonicum may just be a formalisation of a pre-
existing command system. Both Mann and Johnson argue for the interpretation “Shore 
under attack from Saxons”. Mann claims:  
                                                 
165 Cotterill 1993: 231 Despite having discredited the ‘Saxon Sea’-theory for lacking evidence, Cotterill 
maintains in his conclusion “that the term litus Saxonicum may simply be a geographical name”. (Cotterill 
1993: 239) 
166 Johnson 1976: 65 
167 Johnson 1976: 71 
168 Two continental forts are ”described as being in Litore Saxonico” (Johnson 1976: 70) 
169 Johnson 1976: 114 
170 Johnson 1976: 2 
 48
“This string of forts, even if it had been built for some other purpose – which 
hardly seems likely – was clearly employed during the fourth century, and 
whether efficiently or not, in some defensive fashion, against attack from the sea: 
such attack can only have come from Saxons, with or without Frankish allies.”171  
While it is clear from the position of continental Roman borders, which extended as far 
north as present day Belgium, that potential attacks would most likely have come from 
Saxons or other Germanic tribes north of the Roman border, Mann does not say much as 
to why there would be a Saxon threat, but as discussed (cf. p42-46) a potential target in 
the early third century could have been settlements accessed via the Wash estuary. The 
prosperous town of Godmanchester was struck by disaster near the end of the third 
century. The coin sequence suggests an Allectan (293-296 A.D.) terminus post quem.172 
Green speculates that the “scatter of disarticulated human bones and skull fragments” that 
“appear to have been gnawed by dogs or wolves (…) may be evidence for a massacre” 
possibly committed by Saxon raiders.173 Green provides no conclusive evidence for 
piracy, however, let alone Saxon piracy. Still, Godmanchester’s increasing wealth and 
subsequent construction of walled defences during the “later third century”174 indicates it 
could at least have been a tempting target for pirates. Nevertheless, Godmanchester is 
merely an isolated incident which can not be directly linked to piracy. Mann remarks that 
the Saxon Shore forts have been viewed by some scholars:  
“(…) in some sense an entirely new creation of the fourth century – a view 
reinforced by the fact that under its commander are listed nine units, seven of 
which are totally new to the army of Britain as known in the Principate.”175  
Nevertheless, the construction dates of the Saxon Shore forts combined with the 
increasing number of wealthy settlements in south and east England, the increased pirate 
activity evidenced on the continent, and the marked increase in the number of coin hoards 
in Britain from the reigns of Aurelian to Maximian (270 A.D. to 305 A.D.)176 suggest that 
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the Romans had problems containing raiders, but it is difficult to establish who the 
aggressors were – the hoarding may just as well be explained by civil disorder or possibly 
even Pictish raids. Some time between 276 A.D. and 285 A.D. it appears that at least ten 
forts listed in the Notitia under the Litus Saxonicum had been built, two of which were on 
the continent.177 Whether the forts were under a common command, or operating more or 
less independently, their construction appears to attest to the presence of a seaborne 
threat. Eutropius adds strength to the argument that the Saxon Shore forts were necessary 
during the late third century, claiming that the waters around Belgica and Amorica were 
infested by Saxons and Franks.178 Scholars have remarked that the textual records say 
nothing of the coast of Britain, although the Romans could have recognised that seaborne 
raids in Gaul may soon translate into attacks on Britain, if pirates were not already active 
there. Another possibility is that the forts doubled as administrative quarters, either at the 
same time as being garrisoned by troops or in separate periods.  
As discussed, both the Classis Britannica and the Classis Germanica appear to 
have decayed in the period prior to the construction of the majority of the Saxon Shore 
forts. According to Haywood’s interpretation, they could have been “broken up into 
smaller, more localised units under legionary control by the fourth century”. He argues 
the Classis Britannica underwent reorganisation similar to that of the Classis 
Pannonica.179 Johnson points to the presence of the Classis Anderetianorum, a fleet 
named after the fort at Pevensey (Anderitum), as a sign that the Saxon Shore forts, at one 
time, probably all had a fleet assigned to them.180 This would account for the Classis 
Britannica’s disappearance from textual records, and it would make sense from a military 
perspective. Having smaller fleets stationed at or near each Saxon Shore fort would 
enhance the chance of intercepting pirates threatening the British coastline. While the 
original Classis Britannica and Classis Germanica fleets declined, piracy seems to have 
become an increasingly big problem for the Romans. To amend the naval deficiencies, 
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Carausius, a Menapian of considerable naval experience, was appointed as commander of 
the defence of the Saxon Shore. Despite, or maybe because of, Carausius’s success, he 
caught the attention of co-emperor Maximian. Carausius was accused of letting pirates 
pass through the defences and only later intercepting them, seizing and embezzling the 
booty the pirates had collected.181 Eutropius explains that the suspicion of embezzling 
arose from Carausius “having never given back the entire booty to the people of the 
province or sent it to the emperors”.182 There is clearly something to be made of the 
dramatic surge in the number of East English coin hoards during the reigns from Tetrici 
until Carausius assumed power in Britain, from which point there is a clear decline. 
Unfortunately, the relatively few Carausian or Allectan coin hoards from East England 
can not be used to argue whether or not Carausius’ efforts were successful, because they 
say nothing of who ultimately ended up with the (potential) loot.183 Although Carausius’s 
naval merits were impressive, would it have been easy for him to simply ‘allow’ pirates 
through and intercept them on their return? Carausius must have felt quite confident that 
he could deny some, if not most, of the pirates passage back to their homeland, at the risk 
of being removed from his position. Still, Carausius’ military success may alone have 
prompted Maximian’s actions. Even if Carausius exploited the chance to “enrich 
himself”, it is not clear if he actually ‘allowed’ pirates passage, or was even able to deny 
pirates passage through the defences. Carausius’s efforts appear to have been profitable, 
in some way, indicated by his defeat of Maximian in 289 A.D.184 Bird speculates that 
“most of it (the profits) was used to build a bigger fleet.185 The present evidence suggests 
that Germanic pirates were becoming a significant concern during the mid-third century, 
but that diligent effort under Carausius’s command was enough to temporarily check the 
threat. It is seems likely that the Saxon Shore forts played a role in the protection and 
command of parts of the southern and eastern coastline during the late third - and early 
fourth century. Following the return of the province of Britannia to Rome in 296 A.D., 
the Romans seemingly managed to restore the defences to their former efficiency and the 
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seaborne threat was kept in check.186 The crisis of the third century had sent the Western 
Empire into major disarray, but by the end, Diocletian’s reforms had done much to 
restore order. Unrest still forced Constantine to draw troops from Britain to assist 
elsewhere, particularly along the Germanic frontier, early in the fourth century. A major 
issue is that there are few known sources that provide any conclusive evidence on when, 
and to what degree, Saxon piracy appeared. While there could have been a steady flow of 
attacks from across the North Sea throughout the second and third century, one can not 
exclude the chance that there were significant lulls either. 
Tactical Aspect of the Saxon Shore Forts 
Mann refers to Richmond’s (1961) dating of an inscription and pottery from Reculver, 
which has been used to argue for early Germanic piracy:  
“A suggested date in the second decade of the third century led to the assumption 
that the Saxon threat to the east and south coasts, known later in the third century, 
had in fact appeared shortly after 210A.D, but the inscription cannot be so closely 
dated”187.  
Numerous scholars argue that stylistic differences between the Saxon Shore forts are an 
indication of when they were constructed. The architecture of Reculver and Brancaster is 
like that of forts of the early Empire and that has led to a belief that the forts are 
contemporary with each other. If Richmond’s dating is accurate it indicates that the 
Romans attempted to deal with a Germanic seaborne threat in stages, building some forts, 
like Reculver and Brancaster, significantly earlier than the rest of the forts, before finding 
it necessary to upgrade the Saxon Shore system. The dispute about the dating of the 
Reculver inscription has yet to be resolved. If the ‘suggested date in the second decade of 
the 3rd century’ is inaccurate – and major Germanic threat appeared later still, it is 
possible that the Romans anticipated the threat and issued the construction of improved 
military defences on the coast of Britain before the threat surged. Nic Fields remarks that 
“The construction of these forts represents a huge outlay of money, manpower and 
materials”.188 This, combined with the financial trouble and fragmented power in the 
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Roman Empire during the third century limits the likelihood of such a large scale pre-
emptive action. Nevertheless, if local rulers in Britain experienced increasing piratical 
pressure, funds could have been drawn from the province itself to provide for its defence. 
Britain’s growing wealth during the third century is fairly well documented by 
archaeology, and in panegyrics.189 Thus it is more likely, were the forts military, that their 
construction largely mirror the Romano-British experience of pirate threat throughout the 
third century.  
Reculver and Brancaster are constructed in a more conservative style than the 
other Saxon Shore forts. These two forts are similar to forts built as part of the defences 
of Hadrian’s Wall. Tiles found at Reculver and Brancaster indicate that they were 
constructed by Roman units previously stationed in the north and that they could have 
chosen that particular style of construction because they were familiar with it.190 The 
other forts on the Saxon Shore are more traditionally Roman in style, with thicker walls 
and more massive external towers. Some scholars take this as an indication that the forts 
were constructed in phases, which seems likely at Dover, Burgh Castle and Richborough, 
where the towers are secondary to the main construction phase. At the sites where towers 
were added some time after the forts themselves were completed, one may assume that 
the forts had different purposes at different times – perhaps as civilian customs houses 
and later as military buildings. More importantly, if the forts were never used in a 
military sense, why would towers be added to customs houses? It is possible that the 
towers were added to protect wealth stored within the forts from British brigands, but it is 
equally questionable whether a domestic or seaborne threat existed to warrant the 
addition of towers. The towers may appear to make little sense as a countermeasure to 
Germanic raiders, who were more likely to avoid forts altogether, and were not very apt 
at attacking walls. Cassius Dio remarks that Germanic barbarians “did not understand the 
conduct of sieges”191 and there is little to suggest that the Germanic tribes had improved 
their siege tactics even by the seventh century.192 Then again, Germanic ignorance of 
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siege tactics could be argued as a good reason to build imposing walls and towers. 
Ammianus Marcellinus writes that the Gothic chieftain Fritigern said he “did not war 
with stone walls” after a failed siege in the late fourth century.193  
The evidence currently available indicates that most of the forts were finished by 
285 A.D., although Portchester could be Carausian, and Pevensey’s construction has been 
confirmed as of 293 A.D.194 D.A. White suggests that the system of forts was built by 
Carausius to defend Britain against Imperial ambitions to recapture the island.195 It is an 
interesting theory, which could account for the sheer size of the towers at Richborough, 
Portchester, Burgh and Pevensey, which were presumably constructed to hold artillery.196 
The presence of the massive towers would perhaps make more sense if other Roman 
forces, and not barbarians, were the attackers. Still, several of the forts are poorly 
designed for defence and would stand no chance against a Roman siege. One would 
expect a skilled military leader such as Carausius (who by 286/7 A.D. controlled the 
wealth of Britain) to construct a defensive system designed more specifically to counter a 
Roman threat if that was the purpose of the forts. D.A. White’s theory thus fails to 
account for the stylistic differences between the forts, the fact that towers were added 
after the main construction, the evidence that suggests many of the forts were constructed 
before Carausius’ assumed power in Britain and northern Gaul in 286/7 A.D, and the fact 
that many of the forts remained in use well into the fourth century. Fulford and Tyers 
suggest that Allectus’s loss of the port at Boulogne in 293 A.D. exposed Britain to 
seaborne invasion by the central Roman authorities. This, they argue, was partly the 
motive for the construction of coastal fortifications.197 The dating for most of the forts, 
however, fall outside of the reigns of the usurpers Carausius and Allectan. Still, the loss 
of Boulogne may have left the Channel more open to piracy, which necessitated the 
construction of Pevensey during Allectan’s reign in Britain. Ultimately, neither White’s 
theory, nor the theory of Fulford and Tyers hold up against alternative explanations198  
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The addition of towers to several of the forts after they had been constructed 
points to a heightened level of threat or, at the very least a heightened level of perceived 
threat from across the North Sea. The military design of the gates at Portchester, 
Pevensey, Richborough and Lympne indicate that they were constructed to give the 
occupants advantages for defence. Johnson comments on the flaws of several of the forts 
where towers were added subsequently to the main construction phase:  
“The variations in the plan of the towers (fig 64) show the lack of any 
standardized building procedure (…) at Burgh castle there is evidence of a failure 
to grasp the purpose of the towers for tactical defence”.199  
The external towers at Burgh castle seem to have been built by people who lacked 
knowledge of defensive tactics. Some of the towers are placed at positions that do not 
provide effective cross-fire. This anomaly is not found at any other fort where the 
position and nature of the towers are known. The lack of attention to effective military 
design could indicate that the towers were merely added to symoblise authority, possibly 
because the fort only had a civilian function. The differences between the forts suggest 
that they were built in different periods, by different builders with different orders or 
plans, however they could also simply be attributed to a difference of opinion between 
the designers. That the Saxon Shore forts were placed so close to the harbours could also 
imply that they doubled as administrative facilities, taxing trade and controlling the 
shores at the same time. The presence of different types of forts and the addition of 
towers seemingly constructed to hold artillery as a measurement of perceived threat is an 
inexact science at best. We can hardly assume the forts to accurately mirror a threat that 
appears to have gone on for centuries, although with varied severity. 
Strategic Aspect of the Saxon Shore Forts 
In the north-east there are only two Saxon Shore forts, Brancaster and Burgh Castle, 
which are almost 100 kilometres apart. The next fort southward is Walton Castle, of 
which only sketches remain and which has not been conclusively identified as a part of 
the Saxon Shore installations.200 Then there are Bradwell and Reculver, both on the outer 
                                                 
199 Johnson 1976: 115 
200 It is uncertain whether Portus Adurni refers to the fort at Portchester or to Walton Castle, but Johnson 
(1976: 66-68) argues reasonably that Portus Adurni is likely Portchester. That does not, however, entail 
that Walton Castle was not at some stage part of the chain of coastal installations.  
 55
limits of the Thames Estuary – which was much traversed by maritime traders. 
Richborough, Dover, Lympne and Pevensey are all well-placed to control the Straits of 
Dover.201 It seems that the objective was to detect and intercept pirates at the narrow 
straits to stop them from penetrating into the Thames Estuary or through the Straits and to 
the coast of south Britain or northern Gaul. Still, the strategic placement of the 
installations is also reasonable were they used as customs houses. It would have been 
beneficial to place the administrative buildings near the harbour, preferably in an area of 
significant trade and traffic. Cotterill claims the system of forts was “a series of state 
trans-shipment centres”, and is unlikely to have been military because most of the forts 
appeared sixty years prior to the first historical account of Germanic raiding.202 His 
argument, however, relies upon the absence of textual record from a period which is ill-
represented at best and simply does not allow arguments from omission. Cotterill, Milne, 
and Wood, who all favour the trans-shipment theory, fail to explain why supply bases 
would require such elaborate walled defences and towers, or what threat motivated their 
construction. Cotterill, however, suggests that a logistical role at Brancaster and Reculver 
explains why they were not upgraded to the standard of defence seen at the forts 
constructed later in the third century.203 His assumption that a piratical threat would 
necessitate such an upgrade is ill-advised (cf. p52-53).  
It is natural to ask why the Romans would invest in extensive protection of their 
coastline– presumed that the forts were defences - if their shores were already settled by 
the enemy. The question is reinforced by Johnson’s observation that the forts “All the 
sites lie on comparatively low ground near a harbour”, and are not as suitable against 
attacks from inland.204 It is noteworthy that the topography of the areas around forts like 
Burgh, Brancaster, Richborough and Reculver does not provide good options for elevated 
defensive positions. Moreover, an elevated defensive position would be of no use if the 
port was the target, and invasion was not the intention. Scholars have traced a change in 
Romano-British tactical thinking from the early first century - when the Romans began 
favouring protection of lowland sites by relying on natural defences other than the 
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traditional hill-top forts, for example using a meander to protect the flanks of a 
fortification. Even though some hill-top forts stayed in use, a preference for forts 
protecting key lowland positions emerged with the growing number of lowland 
settlements.205 Thus it is not unreasonable to assume that the Saxon Shore forts were built 
with the intent of best commanding the shoreline and river inlets, while still harbouring 
the capacity to withstand direct attack. It is important to remember, however, that forts 
were not normally intended to be ‘last stands’ against an enemy, but rather to be a base 
from which to command a surrounding area and launch counter-attacks once an enemy 
was located. There is no apparent reason why Romans would build forts, seemingly, as 
defence against a primarily coastal threat if Saxons were already settling on the shores. 
That implies, of course, that the settled Saxons were not entirely placid or pacified. Thus, 
the dating and nature of early Saxon settlement plays a role (further, p62-65) 
Could the forts have had land-oriented military functions as well? Mann sheds some 
light on that:  
“Archaeologically, there is virtually no evidence of roads connecting any one of the 
forts with its neighbours and, indeed, with the 40-oared scouting ships that Vegetius 
describes (4.37); communication by sea could have been almost as fast as by land 
(…) hardly any roads are known running to the forts from inland”.206  
Of course, the mere fact that no evidence of land connections between the forts or nearby 
settlements has been found does not exclude the possibility that roads did indeed exist. 
The Oxford Illustrated History of Roman Britain clearly illustrates that road networks did 
connect the Kentish forts Richborough, Dover and Lympne.207 There was seemingly no 
road connection for the other Saxon Shore forts, 208 however, which seems odd if the forts 
had functions besides seaborne operations. Mann suggests that the Romans may have had 
additional garrisons further from the shores that could intercept raiders who managed to 
penetrate inland, a quick reaction force which would be able to defend against attackers 
on a broader scale given knowledge of where the raiders had, or would, come ashore. He 
links his argument to the formation of the Comes Britanniae, which was a mobile cavalry 
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force probably created in the last few years of the fourth century.209 It seems to have been 
a rapid reaction army that was intended to suppress attacks both from pirates on the 
Saxon Shore and raids on the northern frontier. Keeping a mobile force that could 
flexibly respond to attacks may have been necessary when Roman forces were withdrawn 
from Britain to the continent by reducing the permanent garrisons in the Saxon Shore 
fortifications.210 Mann’s theory is supported by the Roman strategic shift from static 
frontier-defences to defence-in-depth, which Faulkner attributes to the many failures of 
static frontier defences during the third century.211 Even if Mann’s theory is accurate, the 
Comes Britanniae only reflects on the Roman defence strategy in Britain more than a 
century after the Saxon Shore forts were constructed.  
In assessing the size and scale of Saxon raids in Roman Britain, Cotterill claims 
that since the Notitia does not list any fleets related to the Saxon Shore save the Classis 
Anderetianorum (which was stationed in Paris), that no fleet existed in Britain during that 
time.212 He relies upon Mann’s argument that the Notitia is a peacetime document that 
relates to pay and supply, and concludes that a fleet not listed in the document could not 
have been paid, and assumes that there were no fleets except for those listed. Cotterill 
dismisses the possibility of other explanations, but the Notitia Dignitatum was not the 
only, let alone an entirely accurate and exhaustive, document listing Roman forces in the 
Western Empire.213 Moreover, Cotterill dismisses Johnson’s arguments that the forts 
would act as a deterrent, because “There are too many rivers and estuaries for a limited 
number of forts to have been a deterrent: forts or fortlets would have been needed on 
every river”.214 For a number of reasons, Cotterill’s inference simply does not follow. 
Firstly, the absence of a ‘perfect’ defence does not entail the absence of a defensive 
policy. The distribution of Saxon Shore forts clearly indicates an attempt to protect the 
estuaries and rivers most vulnerable to piracy. Secondly, dispersing troops to an even 
larger number of forts would make little tactical sense, because then even a small number 
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of pirates would be able to overcome the local defence forces. Thirdly, Saxon raiders 
would not find ‘every river’ a sufficiently attractive target. In the absence of concentrated 
wealth along its banks, a river would not even be considered attractive at all, thus the 
Romans would not need to defend all possible points of entry. Pearson argues that the 
early construction of Brancaster, Reculver and Caister-on-Sea makes no strategic sense 
because it left Suffolk, Essex, Sussex and southern Kent undefended, and adds that the 
system of forts would be “unworkable because it was incomplete”.215 Nevertheless, gaps 
in the fixed defence could have been plugged by the Classis, but as the fleet weakened it 
was necessary to expand the fortification system. Seaborne raiders would also highly 
likely concentrate on estuaries which provided many alternative routes to wealthy targets, 
this to avoid detection, retain the element of surprise, and enable them to attack multiple 
locations during one journey. In that respect, large stretches of the British coastline, such 
as southern Kent or between Walton- and Burgh castle, would likely not be preferred by 
pirates. The early construction of Anglian forts such as Brancaster (and Caister-on-
Sea216) could, as discussed above (cf. p42-45), be explained by a possible Germanic 
threat to towns accessible from the Wash, which would provide raiders many alternative 
routes. Moreover, economic or political problems may have impeded the construction of 
more forts. Generally, Cotterill and Pearson seem to base many of their arguments on 
what an ideal defensive strategy for the Saxon Shore would be, strategies that could not 
have been met by strained Roman forces in Britain. Cotterill suggests that the Saxon 
Shore forts were the “the creation of a coastal logistical system that extended from the 
Wash to the Solway Firth”.217 Nevertheless, the Notitia lists the Saxon Shore as a frontier 
commanded by a military count, and all the forts are linked to garrisons. Clearly, while it 
is possible that the forts doubled as administrative buildings and featured at some point in 
a coastal logistical system, there is no reason to dismiss the evidence that the forts were 
indeed also military in nature, and could easily have served as protection against piracy.  
 The lack of archaeological evidence for a military presence at several of the 
supposedly defensive Saxon Shore forts remains one of the biggest obstacles to military 
interpretation. Although comprehensive modern excavations have yet to be conducted at 
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several of the forts, the absence of military buildings and material has been used to argue 
e silentio that the structures served no military purpose. There is clear evidence of a 
military presence at Brancaster, Reculver and Caister-on-Sea.218 Excavations have proven 
difficult or have been limited at Bradwell, Walton Castle, Burgh Castle, Dover and 
Pevensey. Richborough and Lympne have produced indirect evidence of military 
occupation by what is probably the presence of military baths.219 Pearson notes that 
archaeologists have been forced to rely heavily upon the excavations at Portchester to 
shed light on the functions of the late Saxon Shore system, and remarks that “the 
possibility exists that traces of timber structures have been overlooked during excavation 
or else have been destroyed”.220 Without more detailed excavation of the interiors of the 
forts, scholars will have to remain cautious about drawing conclusions from the absence 
of buildings related to military or supply functions. Ultimately, theories that maintain that 
the system of forts had a military function, and theories that suggest they were a chain of 
non-military supply bases, both currently lack substantial archaeological evidence from 
within the forts’ walls. 
 Another main issue regarding the understanding of the Saxon Shore forts is the 
occupational sequence at each site. As with the dating of construction, the sparse 
evidence at each fort limits understanding of their occupational chronology. It appears, 
however, that most of the forts were abandoned during the second half of the fourth 
century. Only at Richborough and Portchester did occupation continue into the fifth 
century, although military use was seemingly discontinued before ca. 370 A.D.221 Thus, it 
appears that the majority of the forts could have been abandoned before the so-called 
‘Barbarian Conspiracy’ in 367/368. What is to be made of the disuse of the forts remains 
uncertain, but the danger from Saxons and Franks during the 360s, which Ammianus’ 
narrative attests to (cf. p60-61), correlates with the end of military occupation at many of 
the forts. During Magnentius’ attempt to usurp power in the mid-fourth century, he 
gathered troops from Britain (and elsewhere), but his forces were defeated in a “terrible 
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slaughter” in 351 A.D.222 After the victory, central Roman authorities purged Britain of 
officers that had supported Magnentius, and killed a “great number of people”.223 It 
appears that the garrison in Britain was depleted in the aftermath of Magnentius’ failure. 
According to Marcellinus, Britain was in 360 A.D. among “the provinces exhausted by 
former disasters”.224 These events may have prompted the disuse of the forts and thus 
added incentive to attack the weakened parts of Roman Britain, as well as parts of Gaul. 
Pearson, however, suggests the abandonment of the fort system “well before the 
breakdown of Roman authority in Britain” means the forts’ function was not defensive.225 
He also remarks that “The geographical pattern of abandonment also makes little sense if 
regarded as the ‘thinning out’ of a defensive scheme”, because several major waterways 
are left undefended even if Brancaster, Richborough and Portchester may have remained 
in use in the late fourth century.226 Pearson’s argument certainly stands to reason, 
although the possibility remains that the lost Walton Castle227 was in operation, plugging 
the gap between Brancaster and Richborough and denying raiders access to the River 
Deben in Suffolk. The construction of the Yorkshire signal stations228 during the late 
fourth century suggest that the Romans were still trying to handle problems in Britain, 
but that the northern frontier was a priority.  
In Historia Nova, Zosimus writes that the Quadi229 sailed along the Rhine and 
drove out the Salii from an island at the mouth of the Rhine, and later raided Roman 
territory from their new lands.230 It took Julian231 a long campaign to subdue the Quadi, 
who could well have raided both the coasts in Gaul and Britain during the mid-fourth 
century, although their attacks are no more specified than to “Roman territory” in 
general. Although piracy is clearly attested during the mid-fourth century, there is no 
record of attacks on Britain in the first half of the fourth century. Textual record attests, 
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however, to a series of attacks on Britain in the 360s known as the ‘Barbarian 
Conspiracy’. Ammianus Marcellinus writes that in 364 A.D. there was war “throughout 
the Roman world” and that “The Picts, Scots, Saxons, and Atacotti harassed the Britons 
with incessant invasions”.232 Count Theodosius used the port at Richborough when he 
arrived with his army from Gaul to defeat the ‘conspiring’ barbarians. Cotterill argues 
that “it possible that the forts also functioned as transit and holding camps for the 
movement of mobile units, individual soldiers and imperial messengers”.233 This 
contrasts the belief among some scholars that the forts were too small to accommodate a 
large number of troops. Troops stationed at a fort would not have to reside within the 
walls to function as a defence against pirates. 
The barbarian attacks of 367 were quelled by four legions under Theodosius’ 
command.234 That four legions were judged necessary to drive back the barbarians is 
another fact that suggests the enormity of the onslaught on Roman Britain. In 368 A.D., 
Ammianus Marcellinus records that the Franks and Saxons were ravaging Gaul “(…) 
wherever they could effect an entrance by sea or land”. While Ammianus is generally 
considered a credible historian, he has also been criticised for heaping, possibly, too 
lavish praise upon Theodosius the elder, who was responsible for the campaign against 
the ‘conspirators’.235 Ammianus compiled his work during the reign of Theodosius’ son, 
and it is possible that Ammianus overstated the threat to Britain in order to favour 
Theodosius. The lack of archaeological evidence for destruction in Britain has also been 
remarked, although some sites attest to attacks during the late fourth century, and 
Hadrian’s Wall shows signs of undergoing repair and reconstruction after 368 A.D.236  
Marcellinus goes on to say that Theodosius, after the victory against the 
‘conspirators’, “(…) restored cities and fortresses, as we have already mentioned, and 
established stations and outposts on our frontiers (…)”.237 Theodosius also planned “(…) 
to seek everywhere favourable situations for laying ambuscades for the barbarians.”238 It 
is apparent that the expulsion of the barbarians was a difficult process, even for a large 
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army. The possible success of Roman defensive reorganization in Britain is reflected by 
Mann’s comments:  
“Saxon pressure seems to have subsided after 370. Only at the very end of the 
fourth century, if we may believe Claudian (de laudibus Stilichonis 2.247-55), do 
the Saxons seem to have re-emerged to threaten Britain. But the threat mounted, 
to culminate in the attacks of the ‘barbarians from across the Rhine’ (Zosimus 
6.5.2-3) which paralleled the end of Roman rule in Britain in 410”.239  
Nevertheless, the Roman garrison in Britain was dramatically weakened during Magnus 
Maximus’ usurpation of power in 383 A.D., and it is not improbable that piracy remained 
a problem throughout Maximus’ rule in Britain. Claudian refers to a Roman campaign in 
Britain dated to the late 390s A.D., in which he lauds Stilicho for ‘aiding’ Britain against 
enemies such as the Scots, Picts and Saxons.240 The Notitia’s information on troops in 
Britain is believed to have been compiled in the same period, which has led to deviating 
conclusions on the situation in late Roman-Britain. Haywood argues that the absence of a 
fleet stationed in Britain implies the Romans had “effectively lost control of the seas to 
the Saxons and other pirates”,241 while Cotterill believes there was no fleet in Britain at 
all.242 Clearly, Claudian could have overstated the threat to Britain, for poetic or political 
purposes, but that Rome launched a (final) campaign to restore control over Britain 
appears to be a testament to the pressure the province was under. Whether pirate threat 
during the fourth century required the permanent presence of garrisons at some or all of 
the Saxon Shore forts is unclear. 
Saxon Shore: interpreted as ‘a shore settled by Saxons’ 
An alternative interpretation of the term ‘Saxon Shore’ is that it is a stretch of land upon 
which the Saxons were settling and/or had settled. The Notitia Dignitatum does not give 
information on when the term ‘Saxon Shore’ was taken into use, so it is hard to connect 
the term to any specific event, whether settlement of Saxons or construction of forts. The 
possibility that Saxons had settled in the east of England prior to the end of Roman 
Britain requires attention because it affects many of the theories on the Saxon Shore 
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system and the size and scale of Germanic piracy. A large influx of independent Saxon 
settlers would possibly render the Saxon Shore forts ineffective as defence against 
raiders, since hostile Saxons could raid within Britain without having to pass through the 
defensive screen. If the Saxon settlers were merely auxiliaries, however, this would not 
be the case. Evidence of Saxon settlement in Britain prior to the fifth century is scarce, 
contrary to what one would expect were there Saxons enough to warrant a frontier being 
named from their presence. Similarly, there is little conclusive evidence of major Saxon 
settlement in the Gaulish provinces along the Continental Litus. Although a frontier name 
derived from Saxon presence would not necessarily require Saxon settlement on both 
sides of the Channel it would surely require it on one side. The theories regarding the 
origin of the term Litus Saxonicum tend to be needlessly dichotomous. It is possible that 
Saxons were both active raiders and had settled on some scale on the shores of Britain. 
The name, however, only really reflects the time this part of the Notitia can be said to 
have been up to date for this part of the Western Empire. There are some arguments as to 
why the term ‘Saxon Shore’ could have had a double meaning, merging the two 
aforementioned theories. Johnson argues that: “There is some slight evidence that as 
early as the end of the third century there may have been small pockets of Saxons settling 
in East Anglia, perhaps as part of this policy”.243 The ‘policy’ to which he refers is the 
one that the Romans, on occasion, employed various barbarian tribesmen as buffers 
between them and the most troubled enemy lands, giving the tribesmen some economic 
benefits in the process. The Romans would also rely heavily upon barbarian auxiliaries 
towards the end of the Western Empire. Still, it seems unlikely with the aggressive 
impression the Saxons had made on the Romans, that the latter would deem it safe to use 
Saxons as any kind of defence against other Saxons. In fact, the Roman policy was to 
police their provinces with troops that did not speak the language of the natives, to lower 
the chance of desertion and rebellion. There is evidence of Germanic settlers in many of 
the lowland civitates in the northern regions of Roman Britain. Myers thinks there is 
reason to believe that Germanic settlers were responsible for the defence of Roman 
Britain in some northern regions, supported by local levies.244 If the Saxons were 
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employed as auxiliaries, they would probably have been used against other ‘barbarians’ 
such as the Picts or Irish – and in that respect it would have been impractical to settle 
them as far away from the front they were intended to defend as south-east Britain. Still, 
even if the Romans did use various barbarian tribesmen as buffers, this need not have 
been the case with Saxons in south-east Britain. The central argument of the theory that 
Saxons were settled in Britain prior to the end of Roman rule relates to archaeological 
finds, particularly a type of pottery called ‘Romano-Saxon’. Myers, who coined the term, 
argues that the style merged the traditions of Roman wheel-made pottery with Germanic 
decorative style.245 The pottery, though not exactly dated, was made in Roman 
workshops crafting a special variation of wheel-made pottery. Myers dates the Romano-
Saxon pottery pre-A.D. 400 and linked its distribution to the Saxon Shore. Both the 
dating and the correspondence to the Saxon Shore have been disputed by numerous 
scholars.246 Johnson writes that:  
“It is difficult, however, to judge whether these pots were being made for 
communities composed specifically of Saxons: certainly such decorations would 
have appealed to their tastes, but it is dangerous to base conclusions about the 
presence of Saxon communities in any area in Britain merely from the 
consideration of a style of decoration on what are otherwise normal late Roman 
style of pottery”.247 
Even if the pottery evidence is inconclusive as an indicator of Saxon settlement, it does 
suggest that the Romans had some connections to Saxon culture besides warfare, since it 
is unlikely that Saxons exchanged pottery patterns while they were raiding. The Saxons 
were not of one mind, but rather of separate agendas relative to their local chiefs. Some 
Saxons could have come ashore with friendly intentions, trading peacefully and possibly 
influencing pottery design. The Romano-Saxon pottery is poorly dated, and there are 
many uncertainties as to the market it was intended for, in fact, at least one piece of 
Romano-Saxon pottery carried a Latin inscription, so it seems that the style could have 
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been made for Romano-British tastes.248 It is not impossible that members of the North 
Sea Germanic tribes could both have been raiders and traders at the same time – or 
raiders and settlers. If so, the term ‘Saxon Shore’ could well carry a double meaning. 
Nevertheless, the only evidence for the theory that the ‘Saxon Shores’ were named so 
because of Saxon settlers is the inconclusive Romano-Saxon pottery,249 which does not 
provide much for that theory. The authors of the Notitia Dignitatum may have based the 
name on only one fact, probably the idea of Saxon attacks on the shores, but the two 
theories are not mutually exclusive. 
 The Dunkirk II marine transgression that began in the third century has been 
linked to a perceived increase in Germanic piracy,250 but Todd believes the marine 
transgression was not “so drastic as to compel them to seek homes far from their earlier 
dwellings”.251 Presently, there is no proof that Germanic people migrated to Britain 
during the third and fourth century. There is, however, some evidence that the number of 
Germanic auxiliaries were growing significantly during the early fifth century. Germanic 
cemeteries have been found near Roman towns in Leicester, Ancaster and Great 
Chesterford, which combined with the presence of late Roman military equipment, 
suggests the Germans were auxiliaries and not independent immigrants.252 It is unclear 
whether the cemeteries are of Romano-British date. Excavations at Portchester have 
revealed that housing of the Saxon Grübenhaus type was constructed, “these were 
associated with grass-tempered pottery dating from some period in the fifth century”.253 
However, the German settlement is probably from after the end of the Roman rule in 
Britain. Indeed, there is no clear evidence of mass immigration to Britain by Saxons or 
any other Germanic people before the end of Roman control.  
Summary of Chapter II 
It seems unlikely that Germanic raiders would consider Britain a worthwhile target before 
Roman occupation, due to Britain’s lack of portable wealth and the considerable effort it 
would take raiders to get there. Nevertheless, when by the end of the first century Roman 
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culture had spread to rural Britain, and mining of precious metals had begun, it would 
have become an increasingly interesting option for seaborne raiders. The British garrison 
was on numerous occasions depleted due to usurpation or problems on the continent, 
which may have encouraged piracy. Clearly, there was at many times ample reason and 
opportunity for Germanic piracy in Britain, but there is no direct proof of such activity. 
The absence of piracy can not be concluded, however, due to the poverty of textual 
accounts of Britain and Germania. At least some of the Saxon Shore forts appear to have 
served a military purpose during the third century and their inclusion in the Notitia 
Dignitatum under a military Comes presupposes they were in military use at least at the 
end of the fourth century. While the Saxon Shore forts could have been so named due to 
settlement, there is little evidence for such a theory outside of the inconclusive “Romano-
Saxon” pottery.  
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CHAPTER III, CONCLUSION 
While this thesis may have raised more problems than it has solved, it has also exposed 
certain deficiencies in arguments about Germanic piracy in Roman Britain - perhaps most 
notably in John Cotterill’s denial of the possibility that Germanic raiders could have 
struck across the open North Sea. Germanic seafarers could have reached the shores of 
Britain without having to travel down the coastline of present day Holland, Belgium and 
France. At present, however, the argument can not go further than admitting the 
possibility of Germanic open sea travel. While the construction of the militarily 
garrisoned fort at Brancaster in the early third century suggests a naval threat of 
Germanic origin coming from across the open sea, the evidence is merely circumstantial. 
That is also the case with the Antonine Fires, during which the construction of walled 
defences suggests the presence of a threat of non-urban origin, although bagaudae 
banditry can not be ruled out as a cause.  
Another assumption that lacks sufficient evidence is Haywood’s suggestion that 
Chaucian piracy in the North Sea and Channel “probably remained endemic” during the 
second and third centuries, before being succeeded by Frankish and Saxon piracy.254 It 
has been shown that the current evidence suggests the contrary: that piracy emerged only 
occasionally. According to textual and archaeological evidence, periods of piracy appears 
to be followed by periods of relative peace. For example, the aftermath of Carausius’ or 
Theodosius’ efforts in the late third and fourth centuries respectively, both testify to 
temporary restoration of control. Another example is the dubious case of the Antonine 
Fires, which shows that in many settlements walls were abandoned, or construction of 
walls was discontinued, a few years into the third century. Moreover, while some of the 
Saxon Shore forts have produced signs of military occupation, most notably Brancaster 
and Reculver, the apparent periods of inactivity at many of the forts suggests significant 
lulls in piracy. Occasionally, Haywood appears to overstate Germanic military capacity 
(cf. p15-16), and he reads too much into Germanic naval success (cf. p29-30)  
In recent years, theories that the Saxon Shore forts were designed as a military 
response to piracy have been met by growing opposition. Until exhaustive excavations 
are conducted at all the Saxon Shore forts it is unlikely that the arguments about their 
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purpose will be concluded. The time-span of the forts’ construction, diffuse occupational 
sequences, and irregular abandonment are all still interpretational obstacles. What can be 
ascertained, however, is that the forts were not continuously in intensive use. Pearson’s 
conclusion thus stands to evidence: “To envisage a uniform role, unchanging throughout 
their operational lifetime and common to every shore installation, is almost certainly too 
simplistic.”255 Since Germanic piracy appears to have been sporadic, it is perhaps 
reasonable to assume that the forts were garrisoned only during pressing times. What 
turned out to be their ultimate abandonment may have begun as a temporary 
decommissioning, but the continued decline of the Western Empire following the 
Barbarian Conspiracy in the 360s may have interrupted any Roman plans of 
reoccupation. Magnus Maximus’ usurpation in 383 A.D. and subsequent transfer of 
troops from Britain to the continent could have left the forts unmanned. The theories that 
the Saxon Shore forts served as trans-shipment centres and not as “naval police 
stations”,256 disregard the military nature of the forts. For example, Milne’s argument that 
the forts were supply bases “worthy of military protection” presupposes a threat which he 
leaves unspecified.257 It is possible that potential rebellion, or the simply the desire to 
display authority, could have motivated the construction of walls and towers. There is, 
however, little evidence of large scale storage or production from within the forts. Thus 
theories that the forts were primarily military and theories that they were trans-shipment 
centres both lack archaeological support. Civilian and military uses of the Saxon Shore 
forts are not mutually exclusive, and studies of their purpose must be cautious of ‘circular 
cause and consequence’ arguments. Clearly, unprotected trade centres could have 
attracted pirates, which in turn would necessitate a military presence, but it is equally 
possible that the safety of a chain of fortifications would invite an increase in trade in the 
protected area - perhaps initially with the garrison itself, then spreading to local 
settlements. This is a development well-attested along Hadrian’s Wall.  
This thesis has also shown that there is reason to moderate Johnson and 
Haywood’s claims that the Saxon Shore forts were a defence against invasion (cf. p43), 
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as clearly distinct from seaborne raiding. However, the cost of the ship and the crew, as 
well as the ardouos journey, could have led Germanic raiders to practice seasonal piracy 
– a tactic favoured by the Vikings. Temporarily camping near the Wash, or the Humber 
estuary, for example, would have presented a large number of options for seaborne 
raiders. The distribution of shore installations would provide some protection against this 
type of hostility, commanding and protecting the large estuaries and river inlets along the 
coast of East-England. Where there are no shore forts, there are either garrisoned towns 
(such as Brough-on-Humber, protecting the Humber estuary258), or the river inlets are 
largely scattered or inaccessible – as is the case of the coast between Brancaster and 
Burgh castle, between Burgh- and Walton castle or between Pevensey and Portchester. 
Although Cotterill has the impression that an effective defence from pirates requires all 
river inlets to be protected, this is not the case.  
The archaeological absence of conclusively ocean-going vessels of early 
Germanic origin remains an unresolved part of theories of piracy across the open North 
Sea. Despite Caesar’s records of the seaworthy Venetian ships and accounts of Chaucian 
and Saxon piracy, it is not clear whether early Germanic pirates operated exclusively in 
coastal waters or whether they would also navigate the open sea. Nevertheless, the 
academic divide between ‘Celtic’ and ‘Germanic’ maritime capability may be more 
artificial than actual. The textual record shows Germanic piracy only as an occasional 
threat to Roman Gaul. There is no reason to believe piracy was at all times a problem in 
Roman Britain, but lack of textual record is not evidence that there was no piracy. Indeed, 
historical records of Britain are scarce, and little pertains specifically to the military 
history of Britain. Similarly, archaeological evidence, such as coin hoards or destruction 
patterns, is also inherently inconclusive, which leaves little room for modus tollens 
arguments. Ultimately, the study of piracy in Roman Britain hinges upon ill-documented 
events and equivocal textual records, and it would take very little new information to 
defeat a number of theories on Germanic piracy. 
Regrettably, the formal limitations of this thesis have left relevant questions 
largely unattended. A more comprehensive examination of Germanic piracy in Roman 
                                                 
258 An auxiliary fort near Brough-on-Humber was garrisoned during the first and third century, but a 
military supply depot was kept there throughout Roman rule in Britain. (Cleere 1978: 37) 
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Britain should consider 1) the continental side of the Litus Saxonicum in greater detail, 2) 
the Yorkshire signal stations, and include 3) the evidence for Germanic piracy in Belgica 
and Gaul.  
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Figure 2 (Findlay, 1849) Map of Germania 
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Figure 3 (Todd 1981: 212) Saxon Shore developments 
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Figure 4 (Pearson 2005: 75) Map of Late Roman defences 
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Figure 5 Map of Roman Roads in Britain (Salway 1993: 380) 
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Figure 6 Plans of Saxon Shore forts (Cunliffe 1977: 4) 
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